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This article highlights the emergence of a new dialectics between the 
protection of intellectual property and public health in international 
investment law and arbitration. International investment law is a vital area of 
international law, which has furthered the protection of intellectual property, 
considering it a form of investment and providing intellectual property owners 
access to investor-state arbitration. While investor–state arbitration 
constitutes a major development in international law and facilitates the access 
of foreign investors to justice, it may endanger the fundamental values of the 
international community as a whole, unless arbitrators duly take into account 
their role as “cartographers” of international law within their role as 
“adjudicators.” Have arbitral tribunals taken public health considerations 
into account when adjudicating pharmaceutical patent-related cases? If so, 
have they considered public health either as an exception to investment treaty 
standards or as a part of the interpretation of the same standards? What 
techniques are available to avoid regime collisions between international 
investment law and other fields including public health law? This article offers 
a primer on recent investment disputes concerning pharmaceuticals. The 
underlying assumptions of this article are that adjudication is a mode of 
governance, and it has a fundamental importance with regard to the concrete 
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implementation of a given legal regime. The article argues that arbitrators 
should not put an excessive emphasis on the private interests embodied by 
pharmaceutical patents, but adequate consideration should be paid to the 
public interest equally embodied in these rights.  
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In nature we never see anything isolated, but everything in 
connection with something else... 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe1 
In recent years, international investment agreements (IIAs) 2  have 
flourished, furthering the protection of intellectual property (IP) as a form of 
                                         
1 Johann Peter Eckerman, Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret 266, 266-
67 (John Oxenford trans., Smith, Elder & Co. 1850).  
2  International investment agreements (IIAs) – a term encompassing both bilateral 
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investment.3 In general terms, most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) only 
refer to IP rights in their definitions of protected investments.4 These treaties do 
not provide a detailed and specific regulation of IP rights. However, they do 
formally and substantively raise the level of IP protection from the pre-treaty 
status. In fact, by considering IP rights as protected investments, BITs enable IP 
holders to enjoy the substantive and procedural protections of foreign 
investments provided by the applicable treaty. Substantive protections granted 
by IIAs include fair and equitable treatment, national and most favoured nation 
treatment and protection against unlawful expropriation, among others.5  
Besides providing substantive protection to investors’ rights, investment 
treaties also provide IP owners with direct access to investor-state arbitration, 
which can be a powerful dispute settlement mechanism to resolve claims of 
alleged IP infringement.6 This is a novel development in international law 
because investors are no longer required to exhaust local remedies or depend on 
diplomatic protection to defend their interests against the host state. The claims 
                                                                                                                               
investment treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) with investment chapters – are “agreements concluded between states 
for the promotion and protection of reciprocal investments.” See Bertram Boie, The 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is There a 
TRIPS-Plus Dimension? 4 (NCCR Trade Regulation, Working Paper No. 2010/19, 2010). 
3 See, e.g., State Dep’t, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1 (2012) [hereinafter 
US Model BIT] (listing “intellectual property rights” among the “forms that an investment 
may take”); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Ger.-Burundi, art. 1(d), Sept. 10, 1984, 1517 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Germany-Burundi 
BIT] (noting that “[f]or the purposes of the present treaty, the term ‘investments’ shall 
comprise every kind of asset, in particular . . . [c]opyrights, industrial property rights, 
technical processes, trademarks, trade names, know-how and goodwill . . . .”); Agreement 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Peru-China, art. 
1(d), June 9, 1994, 1901 U.N.T.S. 257 (affirming that “[f]or the purpose of this agreement, 
the term ‘investment’ means every kind of asset invested by investors of one Contracting 
Party in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other Contracting Party in the 
territory of the Latter, and in particular, though not exclusively, includes: . . . copyrights, 
industrial property, know-how and technological process . . . .”).  
4 FTAs, however, can include both investment and IP chapters and provide a detailed 
regulation of IP, tightening their protection beyond current international standards. See Susan 
K. Sell, TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 
41, 41 (2007) (highlighting that pharmaceutical companies have “succeeded in getting 
extremely restrictive TRIPS-Plus . . . intellectual property provisions into regional and 
bilateral free trade agreements.”). On the impact of FTAs on access to medicines, see 
generally Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to 
Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399, 399 (2006).  
5  ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
(2012); see, e.g., US Model BIT arts. 3–7; see also Germany-Burundi BIT, supra note 3, at 
arts. 2–3, 4(2).  
6 See, e.g., US Model BIT art. 2. 
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are heard by ad hoc arbitral tribunals whose arbitrators are selected by the 
disputing parties or appointing institutions. Depending on the arbitral rules 
chosen, the proceedings occur behind closed doors (in camera) and the very 
existence of the claim and the final award may never become public.7 
These arbitrations have recently been used by patent owners to challenge 
alleged infringements of their patents by measures of the host state.8 Arbitral 
tribunals have scrutinized how domestic legal systems govern the availability, 
validity and scope of patents.9 These arbitrations have involved “difficult and 
often elusive substantive questions” of intellectual property law,10 and can affect 
a range of important public policy issues, such as public access to medicines. 
Despite the important social and political implications, investment treaty 
arbitration is lacking in transparency, expertise, and arguably, legitimacy.11 
Most arbitral tribunals are neither open to the public nor obliged to publish final 
decisions, and hence lack the transparency generally afforded by normal judicial 
proceedings, even in disputes concerning public goods. Arbitrators may not 
have specific expertise in international intellectual property law, as they are 
mostly experts in international investment law. There are even disputes over 
whether or not norms external to investment law, such as IP law, should be 
relevant in investment treaty arbitration. Finally, according to some authors, 
investment treaty law and arbitration face a “legitimacy crisis” as arbitral 
awards seem to affect public policy “in a vacuum.”12 While arbitral tribunals 
consider important public policy issues, they are detached from the local 
                                         
7  Kate Miles, Reconceptualising International Investment Law: Bringing the Public 
Interest Into Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL 
AUTONOMy 295, 295–96 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis and Susy Frankel eds., 2010) (noting that 
“[a]lthough [investment disputes] resolve questions that can affect significant matters of 
public policy, the public generally does not have access to the documents, the proceedings are 
conducted behind closed doors, and the submission of amicus curiae briefs is restricted, if 
permitted at all.”).  
8 See infra Parts III and IV below for a comprehensive account of the current investor-
state arbitrations of pharmaceutical patents.  
9 Christine Haight Farley, TRIPS–Plus Trade and Investment Agreements: Why More 
May Be Less for Economic Development, 35 U. PA. J. OF INT’L L. 1061, 1065 (2014) (stating 
that arbitral tribunals review state regulatory and judicial measures “for how they define the 
availability, validity and scope of IP rights”). 
10 Id. (noting that “IP law is notoriously full of grey areas due to finely balanced policy 
objectives . . . .”). 
11 See, e.g., Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1521, 1537–38 (2005) (discussing the alleged legitimacy crisis of international investment 
law and arbitration). 
12 See id. at 1571.  
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polities’ needs. Have IIAs “become a charter of rights for foreign investors, 
with no concomitant responsibilities or liabilities, no direct legal links to 
promoting development objectives, and no protection for public welfare in the 
face of environmentally or socially destabilizing foreign investment?”13 Has 
international investment law become a “corporate bill of rights”14 or a “system 
of corporate rights without responsibility”?15 
Recent examples illustrate that investor-state arbitration can affect state 
autonomy in making important public policy decisions in the pharmaceutical 
sector, including making cheap generic medicines widely available and ensuring 
their safety. In 2008, Apotex, a Canadian company, filed an investor-state 
arbitration against the United States, claiming that the U.S. courts had erred in 
applying federal law violating several provisions of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 16 , 17  According to the claimant, the erroneous 
application of the law prevented Apotex from commercializing generic versions 
of medicines, and this amounted, inter alia, to an expropriation of its 
investments.18 In a parallel dispute,19 the company sought over $1 billion in 
damages from the United States after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) imposed an Import Alert on certain generic medicines that were 
produced in Canada, then exported to the U.S. and sold by a U.S.-based Apotex 
subsidiary.20 The FDA issued the alert after its inspections of Apotex facilities 
in Canada found noncompliance with good pharmaceutical manufacturing 
practices.21 In parallel, Eli Lilly, a major U.S. pharmaceutical company, filed an 
investor-state arbitration against Canada after Canadian Federal Courts 
invalidated a pharmaceutical patent on the ground of inutility.22  Eli Lilly 
                                         
13  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Nov. 6–8, 2002, The 
Development Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives, 212, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4 (Aug 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD]. 
14 Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a 
Different Legal Order, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 (2004). 
15 UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 215. 
16 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  
17 Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 22 (Dec. 
10, 2008), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115447.pdf.  
18 Id. ¶ 7. 
19 Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States of America (Apotex III), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/233043.pdf. 
20 Id. ¶ 2.24. 
21 Id. ¶ 2.40. 
22 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada (U.S. v Can.), ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 
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requested the Tribunal award economic compensation of at least 100 million 
Canadian dollars for alleged damages.23 Not only do these cases show the clash 
between the national regulatory measures of the states to regulate IP in the 
public interest on the one hand and international investment law on the other, 
but they also highlight the emergence of a new form of dialectics between the 
private and public interests in IP governance at the international level.  
Have arbitral tribunals taken public health considerations into account 
when adjudicating pharmaceutical patent cases? If so, have they considered 
public health as an exception to investment treaty standards or as a part of the 
interpretation of the same standards? What techniques are available to avoid 
regime-collisions between international investment law and other fields 
including international intellectual property law and public health law? Is 
investment arbitration a suitable forum to adjudicate pharmaceutical patent-
related disputes? Can investment treaty arbitration promote good governance in 
the pharmaceutical field? Is there a convergence or a divergence between 
international investment law and other branches of international law governing 
pharmaceuticals? Are there mechanisms to promote coherence? And is such 
coherence ultimately desirable?  
This article addresses these questions, providing a comprehensive 
account of current investment treaty arbitrations, highlighting their significance 
for global intellectual property governance. It shows that investment arbitration 
serves as a new avenue for the ongoing dialectics between private and public 
interests in IP regulation. Conflicts between private and public interests are 
endemic in IP regulation. These take the form of disputes before various 
tribunals at the national, regional and even international levels. Investment 
treaty arbitration constitutes a new avenue for settling IP disputes. Far from 
being a neutral development of the increasing pervasiveness of international law 
in different areas of regulation, the attraction of IP disputes by investment treaty 
tribunals have the potential to revolutionize the current landscape of IP 
governance.  
While a dialogue between public and private interests is intrinsic to any 
form of regulation and dispute resolution of IP rights, what is new in the 
emerging IP-related investment disputes is the articulation of private economic 
interests by private transnational actors against public national entities before 
international tribunals. In fact, while traditionally international law has only 
enabled states to file claims before international courts and tribunals, 
                                                                                                                               
Eleven, ¶ 35 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw1172.pdf. 
23 Id. ¶ 108. 
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international investment law has empowered foreign investors to file claims 
against states before international tribunals. This development has the potential 
revolutionize IP governance at the national and international levels.24 On the one 
hand, investment arbitration provides a valuable avenue for foreign investors to 
be heard. Although a private investor could complain through its home state, 
inter-state disputes concerning IP have been rare, mainly because states are 
careful not to initiate proceedings and advance arguments that may backfire in 
the future.25 Investor-state arbitration enables nongovernmental actors such as 
multinational corporations to directly file claims against states before 
international tribunals. On the other hand, eminent scholars warn against 
potential abuse of this mechanism,26 as investment arbitration could emphasize 
private interests at the expense of the public interest. Non-state actors may 
adopt a different approach to litigation than state actors. They may strategically 
use investment arbitration to receive monetary compensation for state 
regulatory action,27 and simply by filing an arbitration claim, they may have a 
chilling effect on domestic policy makers. The emerging dialectics between 
private actors and states in investment arbitration needs to be scrutinized given 
the public policy implications it can have on crucial areas of IP governance.  
The tension between patent holders and state authorities in the 
governance of pharmaceutical patents is one example of a broader recurrent 
interplay in international law: the tension between the private interests of 
foreign investors and the regulatory autonomy of the host state. This article 
argues that arbitrators should not put excessive emphasis on the private interests 
in pharmaceutical patents, but must pay adequate consideration to the public 
interest equally embodied in these rights. Excessive protection of 
                                         
24 M. Sornarajah, Evolution or Revolution in International Investment Arbitration? The 
Descent into Normlessness, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 
(Chester Brown and Kate Miles eds., 2011) [hereinafter Sornarajah, Evolution or Revolution] 
(arguing that “disparate trends” in international investment law and arbitration “show neither 
evolution nor revolution but an ongoing conflict [between private and public interests] that 
either will bring a new system – resulting in a revolution – or will keep the old, simply 
because one or the other of the camps wins the tussle.”). 
25 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but did not Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual 
Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. MGMT. 389, 393, 395 (2010) (showing that IP 
complaints amount to only 3 per cent of all claims under the World Trade Organization 
agreements, and that such disputes have a higher settlement rate and lower appeal rate than 
average WTO disputes). 
26 See Sornarajah, Evolution or Revolution, supra note 24, at 631 (arguing that “the law is 
hurtling into ‘normlessness’ as a result of State reactions to expansive interpretations placed 
on treaty prescriptions.”). 
27 See Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 41 (explaining both the low number and the systemic 
type of IP disputes by the limited prospective remedies that the WTO offers to the winning 
complainants). 
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pharmaceutical patents can have a negative impact on the public health policy 
of the host state. This may seem paradoxical, as usually the protection of 
pharmaceuticals is associated with higher investments in the research and 
development of new medicines, and a corresponding broader availability of 
medicines that lead to positive effects on patient welfare. However, in some 
cases, corporations have used intellectual property to chill public health 
regulation. The article concludes with the argument that while investor-state 
arbitration constitutes a major development in international law and facilitates 
the access of foreign investors to justice, it may endanger the fundamental 
values of the international community as a whole unless arbitrators duly take 
into account their role as “cartographers” of international law. 
The article shall proceed as follows. First, it explores what are 
pharmaceutical patents and how they are governed at the international law level. 
Second, it briefly describes the basic structure of investment treaty law and 
arbitration. Third, it illustrates the rise of investor-state arbitrations concerning 
pharmaceuticals. Fourth, it highlights the emergence of a new dialectics 
between intellectual property and public health in international investment law 
and arbitration, examining recent investment disputes concerning 
pharmaceuticals. Fifth, it critically assesses the potential impact of such 
arbitrations on the public health policies of the host state, and proposes some 
legal mechanisms that can help adjudicators to strike a suitable balance between 
the protection of pharmaceutical patents and public health in international 
investment law and arbitration.  
I 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The patent system is based on a trade-off between promoting knowledge 
creation and knowledge diffusion.28 A patent is a type of intellectual property 
constituting a set of exclusive rights granted by a state for a limited period of 
time in exchange for detailed public disclosure of an invention.29 Patents are 
granted for inventions that are: (1) new, (2) nonobvious (involving an inventive 
step), and (3) capable of industrial application (useful).30 In the pharmaceutical 
                                         
28 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Development [OECD], Patents and Innovation: 
Trends and Policy Challenges, 9 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/24508541.pdf 
(noting that patents are “considered to represent a trade-off between incentives to innovate on 
one hand, and competition in the market and diffusion of technology on the other.”). 
29 Id. at 8 (defining patents as “exclusive right[s] to exploit (make, use, sell, or import) an 
invention over a limited period of time (20 years from filing) within the country where the 
application is made.”). 
30 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
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sector, the invention of new medicines entails significant research and 
development costs.31 The patent protection of a given medicine aims to ensure 
the remuneration of the inventor’s efforts and provide an incentive for the 
invention of new medicines.32  
Through this trade-off, pharmaceutical patent protection reflects both 
private and public interests. The patent system rewards the private interest and 
fosters the inventive efforts of the patent owner by awarding her exclusive 
rights for a limited period of time. At the same time, the patent system 
acknowledges the public interest in a two-fold manner. First, medicines 
invented under the incentive of patents may save lives and improve the quality 
of life of patients. Second, competitors may build upon existing knowledge 
inventing new medicines and contributing to the development of science. In 
addition, patients may have access to cheaper generic versions of the same 
medicine after the patent expires. During the patent lifespan, a balance between 
private and public interests is also embodied in the patent regime. The 
enjoyment of IP rights by the patent owner are not absolute, they are limited in 
consideration of the public interest. For example, certain rules provide for 
exceptions to the patent right;33 some uses of the patent may be allowed without 
the patent owner’s consent;34 and there are limits to patentability.35 
However, in recent years, a common criticism has been that legislatures 
and judges have expanded the rights of patent owners too far36 at the expense of 
the global public interest.37 An absolute protection of pharmaceutical patents has 
                                                                                                                               
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
31 Matthew Herper, The Cost Of Creating A New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big 
Pharma To Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-
future-of-medicine/ (“A company hoping to get a single drug to market can expect to have 
spent $350 million before the medicine is available for sale.”). 
32 Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade Related Are Intellectual Property 
Rights? 39 J. INT’L ECON. 227 (1995). 
33 TRIPS Agreement art. 30. 
34 Id. at art. 31. 
35 Id. at art. 27. 
36 See Rachel Sachs, The New Model of Interest Group Representation in Patent Law, 16 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 344, 345 (2014) (“The various fields of intellectual property (IP) law have 
been marked by seemingly ever-increasing levels of protection.”). 
37 See, e.g., Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Get the Balance Right!: Squaring Access With 
Patent Protection, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 309 (2012); CARLOS 
CORREA, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (2000) (mentioning the “general concern that such legislative 
reform can have a major impact on people’s access to drugs and on public health policies in 
the South.”); Victoria E. Hopkins, Analysis of International Patent Protection and Global 
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a negative impact on public well-being. Pharmaceutical patents create welfare-
reducing monopoly rights, which often lead to higher prices due to a lack of 
competition, making medicines less affordable to the poor. Moreover, by 
engaging in “ever-greening” practices, pharmaceutical companies often use 
regulatory processes to extend their monopoly over highly profitable 
“blockbuster” medicines and further jeopardize access to medicines for the 
poor.38 Even where a state adopts emergency measures to limit IP rights to 
facilitate access to medicines, the state’s compliance with international treaty 
obligations to protect IP rights may be disputed.39  
Pharmaceutical patents produce benefits and costs, the extent of which 
are country dependent. 40  The role of pharmaceutical patents in promoting 
research and development of new medicines depends on the amount of 
resources a country devotes to creating intellectual assets41 and the country’s 
ratio between knowledge owned and the knowledge needed to develop the 
pharmaceutical sector. 42  Historical evidence suggests that strong patent 
                                                                                                                               
Public Health, 17 J. PUB. AND INT’L AFF. 83, 83 (2006) (noting that the TRIPS Agreement 
“has elicited public health concerns in developing countries, worried that they will be unable 
to access essential medicines as a result of increasing patented drug costs.”). 
38 Symposium, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 
1101, 1106–07 (2008) (explaining that “evergreening refers to attempts by owners of 
pharmaceutical product patents to effectively extend the term of those patents on modified 
forms of the same drug, new delivery systems for the drug, new uses of the drug, and the 
like.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 348–49 (2007) (noting that in recent years pharmaceutical 
companies have become “quite creative about strategies to secure ‘evergreening’ patents in 
order to defer the date their products go off-patent.”). 
39 An infamous case is that of South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass’n v. 
South Africa, Case No. 4183 (1998). In 1998, the South African Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (PMA) submitted a legal complaint to the High Court of Pretoria 
challenging the legality of relevant provisions of the (South African) Medicines Act in light 
of the TRIPS Agreement. The Medicines Act had been enacted to cope with a public health 
emergency and enabled the state to issue compulsory licenses and use parallel imports to 
make medicines affordable. Due to international protests and public outcry, the claim was 
withdrawn. For a detailed account of the case, see DUNCAN MATTHEWS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT — THE ROLE OF NGOS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 97-99 (2011).  
40  See Peter Drahos, Introduction to GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS – 
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 4 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002). 
41 See Carlos Primo Braga, Carsten Fink & Claudia Paz Sepulveda, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Economic Development, in THE WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY — CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM AND 
THE WTO 245, 254 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2004).  
42 See, e.g., David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 324 (1996). 
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protection can “kick away the ladder” to development for low- and middle-
income countries,43 and that even industrialized countries did not adopt strong 
pharmaceutical patent policies until recently.44 Regulation of pharmaceuticals is 
a sensitive field with important public policy implications. Given that medicines 
and vaccines are now subject to patent protection worldwide,45 their price 
increase has strained public health budgets.46  
Pharmaceutical regulation constitutes a regime complex, which involves 
sets of multilevel regulatory frameworks that are at times diverging and at times 
converging, if not overlapping. 47  As a regime complex, pharmaceutical 
regulation is characterized by institutional density and governed by human 
rights law, international intellectual property law and international health law.  
A.  Pharmaceuticals and Human Rights Law 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)48 provides the human rights component of the pharmaceutical regime 
complex. Article 15 of the ICESCR identifies the need to protect both public 
and private interests in knowledge creation and diffusion. 49  Namely, it 
recognizes the right of everyone “[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific … production of which he is 
                                         
43  HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1–5 (2003) (providing a historical overview of the economic 
development of industrialized countries and arguing that through the Washington Consensus 
such countries prescribe policies for the developing countries which they have not used 
themselves during their period of economic growth). 
44 Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: Historical 
Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 287, 305–06 n.8 (2001) (noting that 
pharmaceutical products “remained unpatentable until 1967 in West Germany and France, 
1979 in Italy, and 1992 in Spain. Pharmaceutical products were also unpatentable in Canada 
into the 1990s.”). 
45 See TRIPS Agreement art. 27 (The TRIPS Agreement has required the patentability of 
pharmaceuticals). 
46 Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Price of Prevention: Vaccine Costs Are Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2014, at A1. 
47 See Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 
9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7 (2011) (introducing the notion of “regime complex” and defining it as a 
“loosely coupled set of specific regimes.”). 
48 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 ILM 36 [hereinafter ICESCR]. As of 2015, the Covenant has 164 
parties. The United States has signed but has not ratified the Covenant. See Philip Alston, The 
US Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an 
Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 365 (1990). 
49 ICESCR, supra note 48, at art. 15.  
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the author,”50 including pharmaceutical patents, on the one hand and the “right 
of everyone … to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications” 
on the other.51 In parallel, Article 12 of the ICESCR recognizes “the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.” The right to health requires access to medicines, according to 
General Comment 14.52 While general comments are not binding instruments, 
they are deemed to constitute authoritative interpretation of states commitments 
under the ICESCR and can reflect emerging norms of customary law. 53 
Although conceptualized after World War II, the right to health was under-
theorized due to political reasons.54 However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
like other economic, social and cultural rights, it has had a renaissance, being 
understood in its “unity and complementarity” with civil and political rights.55  
Yet, the lack of a World Human Rights Court (WHRC) 56  and the 
fragmentation of international human rights institutions have inevitably affected 
                                         
50 Id. art. 15.1.c. 
51 Id. art. 15.1.b. 
52 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”), General Comment 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12), ¶ 17, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (2000), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000 
.4.En (“The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness [in] (art. 12.2 (d) [of the ICESCR]), both physical and 
mental, includes the provision of equal and timely access to basic preventive, curative, 
rehabilitative health services and health education; regular screening programmes; 
appropriate treatment of prevalent diseases, illnesses, injuries and disabilities, preferably at 
community level; the provision of essential drugs; and appropriate mental health treatment 
and care.”).  
53 Helen Keller & Lena Grover, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and 
Their Legitimacy, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 116, 132 
(Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012).  
54  VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 27 (2012) [hereinafter VADI] (“Given the political divide between the Eastern 
and Western blocs determined by the Cold War, the right to health as well as other economic, 
social and cultural rights were deemed to be politicized as reflecting a socialist perspective. 
The traditional distinction between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights was also based on the assumption that while the first category of rights was susceptible 
to immediate realization, the second was deemed to be only of gradual implementation. The 
dichotomy was formalized by the division of the so-called International Bill of Rights into 
two Covenants adopted in 1966.”). 
55 Id.  
56 On the desirability of a World Human Rights Court, see generally Stefan Trechsel, A 
World Court for Human Rights? 1 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 3 (2004); Int’l Comm. of Jurists, 
Towards a World Court of Human Rights: Questions and Answers, 2 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter 
Int’l Comm. of Jurists] (highlighting “a glaring gap in th[e] . . . human rights architecture: a 
World Court of Human Rights, that would make available a judicial mechanism to provide 
enforceable and effective justice to individual victims of human rights violations.”).  
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the realization of the right to health.57 States maintain the prime duty of 
providing access to remedies at the domestic level. 58  However, effective 
remedies should be available at both the national and international levels,59 
because international remedies are essential in those cases where domestic 
remedies are not available or inadequate.60 Several UN bodies deal with human 
rights,61 but they do not fulfill the tasks of a world court for human rights.62 
Moreover, the institutional fragmentation of the human rights system — the 
existence of different UN bodies and monitoring frameworks with converging 
and diverging competences, 63  — and its substantive fragmentation — the 
existence of different treaties and regimes — can create obstacles to the 
effective realization of the right to health.64   
B.  Pharmaceuticals and International Intellectual Property Law 
Several sources of international intellectual property law govern patent 
regulation. The Paris Convention65 conceptualizes intellectual property as an 
                                         
57 Laurence R. Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The 
Contested Evolution of the Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 311, 317 (Terence Halliday & Greg Shaffer eds., 2014). 
58 Int’l Comm. of Jurists, supra note 56, at 2 (pinpointing that states have “the primary 
responsibility for providing access to remedies at the national level.”). 
59 Id. at 2 (arguing that “victims of human rights violations should have access to 
effective remedies at both the national and international levels.”). 
60 Id. (stressing that “a complementary system of remedies at the international level is 
necessary to address instances where a State is unable or unwilling to provide remedies for 
violations or where such remedies are ineffective.”). 
61 Trechsel, supra note 56, at 4 (noting that “[t]here is already quite an impressive list of 
bodies which deal with human rights within the framework of the United Nations.”).  
62 Id. at 5 (pinpointing that “none can be regarded as a substitute for a world court for 
human rights” as “[e]ither [such UN bodies] are not judicial bodies—this applies in particular 
to the various commissions and committees—or they are not directly dealing with human 
rights issues, which applies to the Criminal Tribunals”). 
63 On the institutional fragmentation of the human rights system, see, e.g., Marjan 
Ajevski, Fragmentation in International Human Rights Law – Beyond Conflict of Laws, 32 
NORDIC J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 87, 88 (2014). 
64 Mehrdad Payandeh, Fragmentation within International Human Rights Law, in A 
FAREWELL TO FRAGMENTATION: REASSERTION AND CONVERGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
297 (Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge eds., 2015) (stigmatizing the risks of conflicting 
jurisprudence among different monitoring bodies due to “structural biases of the different 
human rights treaty bodies.”).  
65 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20 1883, last revised at 
Stockholm on July 14 1967, and amended on Sep. 28 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter 
Paris Convention]. 
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incentive to encourage innovation. 66  It harmonizes procedures relating to 
priority, registration, and licensing and requires national treatment for foreign 
patent owners. 67  In theory, a member that has failed to comply with its 
obligations under the Paris Convention could be sued before the International 
Court of Justice,68 but no such cases have ever been brought.69 Nonetheless, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(TRIPS Agreement) under the World Trade Organization (WTO),70 incorporates 
some provisions of the Paris Convention and can be implemented through the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM).71  
The TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive international treaty 
setting global standards for medical knowledge governance.72 It requires WTO 
member states to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals.73 The patent 
owner is given limited monopoly rights over the patented medicine for twenty 
years, 74  and after this patent term expires, competitors may replicate the 
compound.  
The TRIPS Agreement has been controversial since its inception. 
Developing countries opposed its adoption fearing that the introduction of high 
standards of intellectual property protection would jeopardize access to 
pharmaceuticals and other technology, and that the agreement would privilege 
the private economic interests of patent holders vis-à-vis important public 
                                         
66 Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How 
International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property 3–4 (N.Y. Univ. Public Law & 
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 14-53, 2014). 
67 Helfer, supra note 57, at 314. 
68 Paris Convention, supra note 65, at art. 28. 
69 Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 66, at 5. 
70 TRIPS Agreement Annex 1C. 
71 The TRIPS Agreement has incorporated some of the fundamental principles of the 
Paris Convention such as the equal treatment of nationals and foreigners among others. See 
TRIPS Agreement art. 3; see also id. art. 2.1 (stating that “Members shall comply with 
Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19 of the Paris Convention.”). 
72  For a detailed commentary, see CARLOS CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS — A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); 
DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (4th ed., 
2012). 
73 TRIPS Agreement at art. 27 (introducing pharmaceuticals as a patentable subject matter 
and requiring that patents be available in WTO member states “for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”). 
74 Id. at art. 33 (stating that “[t]he term of protection available shall not end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.”). 
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policies furthering public health and developmental objectives.75 Some scholars 
also doubted intellectual property’s link to trade, given its effect of restricting 
the market.76 Not by chance, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 77 listed intellectual property among the general exceptions to the 
general commitment to free trade and lower tariffs.78 Nevertheless, through 
intense negotiation and linkage bargaining – that is, linking negotiations on 
intellectual property to negotiations in other sectors such as agriculture – the 
TRIPS Agreement was signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial conference in 1994, 
as part of a package deal with the other Uruguay Round Agreements, and came 
into force in January 1995. 79  As the outcome of intense cross-sectorial 
negotiations, the signing of the TRIPS Agreement does not mean that it 
provides an optimal equilibrium between the private and public interests. 
Rather, countries accepted its high standards of IP protection potentially 
reducing their regulatory autonomy in the pharmaceutical sector in light of the 
overall perceived benefits of the entire WTO package. By conceptualizing IP as 
a commodity, 80  the TRIPS Agreement severely constrained the regulatory 
autonomy of states in the pharmaceutical sector.  
                                         
75 Jerome H. Reichmann, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation 
with the Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT.’L L. 441, 441–43 (2000) (pointing 
out that the TRIPS Agreement imposed “relatively high” standards of intellectual property 
protection which de facto correspond to those used in industrialized countries). 
76  Michael Spence, Which Intellectual Property Rights are Trade-Related?, in 
ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 263–85 (Francesco Francioni 
and Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2001).  
77 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
78 Id. at art. 20(d) (“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: . . . (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those 
relating to . . . the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices . . . .”). 
79 José E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 147 (2002) 
(noting “[t]he WTO's success in ‘nesting’ issues within a broader context so that the ‘fabric’ 
of one became the foundation for another, as well as in making possible package deals 
between previously unlinked issues.”). 
80 Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 66, at 3, 32 (noting that the TRIPS Agreement “moved 
from framing IP as a barrier to trade into conceptualizing it as a tradable commodity in the 
name of facilitating trade” and suggesting that the system may be “inclined to interpret 
proprietary rights broadly while construing user interests narrowly.”). On the different, albeit 
related, phenomenon of the propertization of intangible assets, see Valentina Vadi, 
Trademark Protection, Public Health and International Investment Law: Strains and 
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The TRIPS Agreement provides minimum standards for intellectual 
property protection, below which the member states cannot fall. 81  WTO 
Members have the right to provide for more extensive protection that is not 
required by the TRIPS Agreement, as long as they follow the general principles 
of the most-favoured-nation clause and national treatment.82 Therefore, any 
intellectual property agreement negotiated subsequent to TRIPS by WTO 
members can only create similar or higher standards for IP protection 
(commonly known as TRIPS-plus).83 Members can enforce the provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement through the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), 
which has compulsory jurisdiction over TRIPS-related disputes.84 
International investment law, the last wave of IP rights protection, 
considers IP as a form of investment.85 As investment treaties broadly define the 
notion of investment, a potential tension exists when a state adopts measures 
governing pharmaceutical patents that interfere with foreign investments. This 
is because such regulation may be considered a violation of investment treaty 
provisions protecting the patent rights of foreign companies. Moreover, because 
investment treaties provide foreign investors with direct access to investment 
arbitration, foreign investors can directly challenge national measures and can 
seek compensation for the impact of such regulation on their business. Indeed, a 
number of investor-state arbitrations have dealt with pharmaceutical regulation, 
and the time is ripe for a comprehensive analysis and critical assessment, 
                                                                                                                               
Paradoxes, 20 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 773, 775 (2009) (“The propertization of intangible goods has 
become a common trend in international standard setting. Propertization can be defined as the 
process of putting emphasis on proprietary aspects of given intangible rights or the 
characterization of modern knowledge governance as moving towards a property-based 
regime.”). 
81 TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1 (“Members shall give effect to the provisions of this 
Agreement.”)  
82 Id. (“Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not 
contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”).  
83 In recent years, states have signed a number of regional and bilateral agreements 
including TRIPS-plus provisions. On the phenomenon, see, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Back to 
Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. 
OTTAWA L. & TECH J. 125, 141 (2003–2004) (describing the phenomenon of forum shifting 
as a means of increasing the strength of protection of intellectual property rights). 
84 TRIPS Agreement art. 64. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement 
Together, 37 VAND. J. INT’L L. 275, 282 (1997). 
85 Boie, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that “[international investment agreements] usually 
protect intellectual property by including it in the definition of investment.”). 
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especially concerning their potential effect of emphasizing private property at 
the expense of the public interest.86   
C.  Pharmaceuticals and International Health Law 
In contrast with IP protection, another component of the regime 
governing pharmaceuticals, international health law, has developed slowly.87 
The internationalization of public health law is not a new phenomenon. The 
shift from national to international governance began in the mid-19th century,88 
when states adopted a discrete number of binding international conventions 
dealing with various aspects of public health.89 The cholera epidemics through 
Europe in the first half of the 19th century catalyzed intense international health 
diplomacy and cooperation.90 Not only did the cholera epidemics show the 
failure of national quarantine systems to prevent the spread of the disease, but 
they also created discontent among merchants, whose trade had been affected 
by the quarantine measures.91 The merchants urged their governments to take 
international action.92 The first International Sanitary Conference was organized 
in 1851 “to discuss cooperation on cholera, plague, and yellow fever,”93 and 
established the principle that “health protection was a proper subject for 
                                         
86 Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 66, at 3. 
87 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEO. L. J. 423, 
424 (2007–2008) (describing international health law as “a relatively new academic field”); 
Shawn H.E. Harmon, International Public Health Law: Not so Much WHO as Why, and Not 
Enough WHO and Why Not? 12 MED. HEALTH CARE AND PHILOS. 245, 245 (2009) (noting 
that “neither the WHO … nor international law … have yet played their necessary part in 
promoting ‘health for all.’”); see generally DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIAL ON AND ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE (2000). 
88 David P. Fidler, International Law and Global Public Health, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1999–2000) [hereinafter Fidler, Int’l Law and Global Public Health] (highlighting “states’ 
extensive use in the late part of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century 
of international law in dealing with public health problems.”).  
89 The First International Sanitary Convention focused on cholera. See BOB REINALDA, 
ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: FROM 1815 TO THE PRESENT DAY 
172 (2009). The Convention was adopted at the seventh International Sanitary Conference 
held in Venice in 1892. See AGINAM OBIJIOFOR, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD 51 (2005). 
90  David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: The First 100 Years of 
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international consultations.” 94  Other international conferences followed, 
“focusing exclusively on the containment of epidemics.”95  
Despite these early adoptions of binding international health law 
instruments, since the inception of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
1946,96 international health law has taken a less ambitious path. In fact, the 
WHO has favored non-legal, medical-technical approaches to health issues.97 
The WHO, mainly composed of health specialists,98 has principally, if not 
exclusively, adopted medical guidelines and other nonbinding tools. It has 
developed “an ethos that looks at global health problems as medical-technical 
issues to be resolved by the application of the healing arts.”99 Instruments such 
as declarations and recommendations adopted by the WHO have been described 
as “limited in scope and application”100 as well as “historically, politically and 
structurally inadequate to do what is needed.”101 Such instruments “are being 
developed ... in an uncoordinated … manner” and “pale in comparison to that of 
other international [organizations] ….”102 International health law has not been 
an effective system, due to its mainly non-legal approach, lack of enforcement 
mechanisms and states’ consequent failure to comply with its rules.103 The 
WHO adopted its first binding convention only a decade ago. 104  The 
organization “rarely participate[s] in trade negotiations or the resolution of trade 
disputes, even when such are linked to public health.”105 Only in 2015 has it, 
                                         
94 WHO, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2007: A SAFER FUTURE: GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2007). 
95 Id. 
96 Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 
U.N.T.S. 185. 
97 Fidler, Int’l and Global Public Health, supra note 88, at 22 (noting “the historical 
penchant [of the WHO] for dealing with public health problems within a narrow ‘medical-
technical’ approach.”).  
98 Id. at 22 (“WHO has historically been staffed predominantly by physicians, medical 
scientists, and public health experts.”). 
99  David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organization: What Role for 
International Law? 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1099 (1998).  
100 Harmon, supra note 87, at 251. 
101 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
102 Id. 
103 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global Health Law, 96 GEO. L.J. 423, 
438 (2007–2008) (noting that “international health law has been viewed as ‘ineffective’”). 
104  WHO, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 6 (2003), 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf. 
105 Harmon, supra note 87, at 251. 
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cautiously, started intervening in investment treaty arbitration as amicus 
curiae.106  
In the absence of a well-articulated international health law regime, 
public health protection has remained a fundamental prerogative of the states.107 
States have a right and a duty to protect public health, and the power to adopt 
measures to protect their population: one of the conditions of their very 
existence.108 Each state has a social contract with its citizens, which prompt it to 
assume these public-health related burdens.109   
Given the interconnectedness of health with other global issues, including 
trade and foreign investments, 110  and the asymmetrical development of 
international health law and other fields of international law, many elements of 
public health governance have been affected by the actions of international 
bodies whose primary objectives do not concern health. 111  For instance, 
international investment law and arbitration has increasingly governed or 
impacted international public health policy. The following sections will 
examine this interplay, focusing on how international investment law governs 
pharmaceutical patents and how investment treaty arbitral tribunals have 
adjudicated the relevant disputes.  
                                         
106 Jarrod Hepburn, Clovis Trevino & Luke Eric Peterson, World Health Organization is 
Given Green-Light by Arbitrators to Intervene in Philip Morris v. Uruguay Arbitration, 8 
INV. ARB. REP. 1, 31 (2015) (noting that “[i]n their request to intervene, the WHO and the 
FCTC Secretariat contended that their submission ‘may assist the tribunal in the 
determination of factual and legal issues’ as it w[ould] provide evidence of the relation 
between health warnings and labeling and the protection of public health, on tobacco control 
globally which, in their view, may assist the tribunal in assessing the claimant’s legitimate 
expectations and the legal relation between the FCTC and the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT.”). 
For a commentary of the specific arbitration, see Valentina Vadi, Global Health Governance 
at a Crossroads: Trademark Protection v. Tobacco Control in International Investment Law, 
48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 93–130 (2012). 
107 Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century 283 JAMA. 2837, 2837 
(2000) (highlighting that “the government has the primary responsibility to advance the 
public’s health because it acts on behalf of the people” and noting, at 2838, that “theories of 
democracy” explain “the primacy of government in matters of public health.”).  
108 VADI, supra note 54, at 30; Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
art. 1., Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (stating that a population is one of the 
three elements required for statehood, together with territory and government).  
109 Harmon, supra note 87, at 247. 
110 Allyn Taylor, Global Governance, International Health Law and WHO: Looking 
Towards the Future, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 975, 975–76 (2002), 
http://www.who.int/docstore/bulletin/pdf/2002/bul-12-E-2002/80(12)975-980.pdf. 
111 Id. at 251. 
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II 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION  
International investment law constitutes an important part of international 
law governing foreign direct investment (FDI).112 As there is still no single 
comprehensive global treaty, investor rights are mainly defined by almost 3,000 
international investment agreements (IIAs), which encompass both bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral instruments, that are signed by 
participating states and are governed by public international law.113 Under these 
agreements, state parties concede to provide a certain degree of protection to 
investors who are nationals of contracting states. These concessions include 
compensation in the case of expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, most 
favoured nation treatment, and full protection and security, among others.  
As IIAs are “the most important instruments for the protection of foreign 
investment,” 114  there is a general expectation that the conclusion of such 
agreements will encourage FDI among the contracting nations. 115  Host 
                                         
112  JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 14–15 (2011). For a historical overview, see ANDREAS 
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 469-494 (2d ed. 2008); JESWALD W. 
SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2010); M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 19–28 (3d ed. 2010); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & 
LUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 3–57 (2009).  
113 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], World Investment 
Report 2011, 100, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2011 (July 26, 2011). 
114  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: 1959–1999, 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA2 (Dec. 14, 2000).  
115 Some authors are skeptical about whether BITs actually attract investment. See Jason 
W. Yackee, Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link between Investment 
Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS (Sauvant & Sachs eds. 2009); Jason W. Yackee, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote 
Foreign Direct Investment, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 807 (2008). See generally M. 
Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? 
Only a Bit… And They Could Bite (Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3121, 2003). 
However, other authors have identified a positive impact. See generally Jeswald Salacuse & 
N. P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 67 (2005); E. Neumayer & L. Spess, Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 
WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005); A. Bénassy-Quéré, M. Coupet & T. Mayer, Institutional 
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment, 30 WORLD ECONOMY 764 (2007); P. Egger & V. 
Merlo, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on FDI Dynamics, 30 WORLD ECONOMY 
1536 (2007); P. Egger & M Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on 
Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. OF COMPARATIVE ECON. 788 (2004); J. Tobin & S. Rose-
Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing 
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countries, generally developing and least developed countries but now 
increasingly developed countries,116 assume obligations for the protection of 
foreign investments in order to attract foreign investments. Countries also 
adhere to these dealings to protect the economic interests of their nationals 
investing overseas. For both of these reasons, such agreements have come to 
play a major role in the growing competition to attract and export FDI. 
At the procedural level, IIAs can grant foreign investors holding patents 
direct access to investment treaty arbitration.117 In doing so, they create a set of 
procedural rights for the direct benefit of investors.118 This is a novelty in 
international law, as customary international law does not provide such a 
diagonal mechanism for settling disputes between foreign investors and host 
states.119 The rationale for internationalizing investor-state disputes lies in the 
assumed independence and impartiality of international arbitral tribunals, while 
national dispute settlement procedures are often perceived as biased or 
inadequate to protect foreign investors.120 Arbitration is also used because of 
perceived advantages in confidentiality and effectiveness.121 
                                                                                                                               
Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Yale Law and Econ. Working Paper 
No. 293, 2005).  
116 See generally Valentina Vadi, Converging Divergences: The Rise of Chinese Outward 
Foreign Investment and Its Implications for International (Investment) Law, 2011–2012 Y.B. 
INT’L INV. L. 705 (2013) (noting that the traditional distinction between capital importers and 
capital exporters has become blurred and investment treaties have increasingly been signed 
not only among industrialized countries on the one side and developing countries on the other 
side, but also among LDCs and emerging economies). 
117 Lahra Liberti, Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements: An 
Overview 1, 3 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., 2010/01, 2010), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/intellectual-property-rights-in-international-investment-
agreements_5kmfq1njzl35-en (noting the “possibility for an IPR holder to bring a claim 
against a state under the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.”). 
118 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity 10 ICSID REV. FOR INV. L. J. 232, 239 
(1995). 
119 David R. Sedlak, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can 
the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 147, 147–49 (2004) (noting that investor-
state arbitration has become a standard feature in international investment treaties since the 
1980s). 
120 See Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 24 (2009). 
121 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment: 
The Role of the World Bank, with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 97, 103 (1986) (noting that “The main features of th[e ICSID System] 
include its voluntary character, its flexibility, and its effectiveness.”).  
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Investor-state arbitration is procedurally similar to international 
commercial arbitration between private parties. 122  The parties choose the 
arbitrators among law scholars and practitioners.123 Although arbitrators are 
expected to be both independent of the party appointing them and impartial,124 
they may permissibly share the political, economic, or legal ideals of the party 
that nominated them. From the offset, such appointees may be presumed 
sympathetic to the nominating party’s contentions and positions.125 
Confidentiality is one of the main features of arbitral proceedings as 
generally hearings are held in camera, and documents submitted by the parties 
remain confidential in principle.126 Final awards may or may not be published, 
depending upon the parties’ will. Names of the parties can remain undisclosed, 
as do the details of the dispute, albeit to a lesser degree.  
Although confidentiality is well suited to private commercial disputes, the 
same may be problematic in investor-state arbitration, because arbitral tribunals 
can require states to compensate investors for regulations that hurt the latter. 
The lack of transparency may hamper efforts to track investment treaty 
arbitrations, monitor their frequency, and to assess the policy implications that 
flow therefrom.127 Because investment disputes are settled using a variety of 
                                         
122 Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of 
the Dolphin and the Shark), in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 217, 
232 (Julian Lew & Loukas Mistelis eds., 2006).  
123 JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 69 (1999) (“The parties choose an uneven number of arbitrators, three in the absence of 
agreement, and the persons to act as arbitrators.”); J.A. Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO 
Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: The Creation of International Legal Fields, 1 ONATI SOCIO-
LEGAL SERIES 1, 14 (2011) (“Virtually all ICSID arbitrators and ad hoc committee members 
have some legal background, since only 0.4% of the whole population is composed of 
individuals who had not at least studied law. On the other hand, WTO figures are very 
different: 45% of panelists and 10% of AB members have no links to any legal background or 
professional activity.”). 
124 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L. 
J. 427, 466 (2010). 
125 Alan S. Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 507 (1997). 
126  Some hearings have been broadcast in special viewing rooms at the ICSID 
headquarters in Washington, but were not webcast. See Lise Johnson, As Hearings Kick Off 
in Apotex v. USA Arbitration, New Pleadings Show Continued Sparring Over Canadian 
Drug Companies’s Claim to Own NAFTA-Protected Investments, 6 INV. ARB. REP. 1, 5 
(2013). 
127 While more awards have been published, some arbitrations and the relevant awards 
were given minimal publicity. For instance, a redacted version of the Servier award, 
discussed below, was released by a Polish Government agency following a request under the 
country’s access to information laws. A May 2013 ruling of the Warsaw District 
Administrative Court directed Poland’s Ministry of Health to release the Servier award, 
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arbitral rules,128 some of which do not even disclose the existence of arbitration 
claims, there can be no accurate accounting of all such disputes.129 This should 
be a matter of concern given the public policy implications of such disputes.  
In recent years, efforts to make investment arbitration more transparent 
have been undertaken in various fora. In response to calls from civil society 
groups, the three parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Canada, the United States, and Mexico, have pledged to disclose all 
NAFTA arbitrations and open future arbitration hearings to the public.130 
Similarly, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) requires public disclosure of dispute proceedings under its auspices,131 
including the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and an 
indication of the date and method of the termination of each proceeding. 
Increasingly, arbitral tribunals have allowed public interest groups to present 
amicus curiae briefs or to access the arbitral process.132  
However, these important developments in transparency appear in only a 
limited number of investment disputes. The vast majority of existing IIAs do 
not mandate such transparency, which means that most of the proceedings are 
still resolved behind closed doors. The recent adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the 
“Mauritius Convention on Transparency”),133 by which Parties to IIAs have 
                                                                                                                               
subject to any redactions of confidential commercial information. A previously released copy 
of the 2012 award offered only the cover page and signature page. See Jarrod Hepburn, 
Poland Releases A New – Less Redacted – Version of Award From Dispute With French 
Pharma Companies; MFN can’t Broaden Investment Treaty’s Arbitration Clause, 6 INV. 
ARB. REP. 1, 3–4 (2013). 
128 States usually offer investors a variety of rules to choose from, which may include the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the arbitration rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or other arbitration rules such as the arbitration 
rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). 
129 Luke Eric Peterson, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. [IISD], Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Development Policy-Making, 15 (2004). 
130 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-
Disputing Party Participation, at 7 (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/38791.pdf. 
131 ICSID, Administrative and Financial Regulations, Reg. 22: Publication, at 66, ICSID 
Doc. ICSID/15 (April 2006), [hereinafter ICSID, Admin. and Financial Regs.], 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf). 
132 ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 37: Visits and Inquires; 
Submissions of Non-Disputing Parties, at 117, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (April 2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
133  United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration (the “Mauritius Convention on Transparency”), Dec. 10, 2014, A/RES/69/116. 
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expressed their consent to apply the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency in agreement-
based investor-state arbitrations, may increase the transparency of such 
disputes. 
Finally, awards rendered against host states are, in theory, readily 
enforceable against host state property worldwide due to the widespread 
adoption of the New York,134 and Washington Conventions.135 In arbitrations 
under the ICSID Convention, awards are only subject to an internal annulment 
process, enforced as a local court judgment, and exempt from the supervision of 
local courts. 136  In non-ICSID arbitrations, annulment is subject to the 
supervision of the courts at the seat of arbitration, and enforcement is governed 
by the New York Convention, which allows for non-recognition and non-
enforcement of an award only on limited grounds.137 Thus, if the arbitration is 
sited in a country other than the host state, there may be no capacity whatsoever 
for the host government to challenge the award in its own legal system.  
Given these characteristics of the arbitral process, significant issues arise 
in the context of disputes involving pharmaceuticals. Arbitration structurally 
constitutes a private model of adjudication, but arbitral awards ultimately shape 
the relationship between the state and private individuals.138 Arbitrators weigh in 
on vital policy matters such as the legality of governmental activity, the degree 
to which individuals should be protected from regulation, and the appropriate 
role of the state.139 In cases involving public health, one may wonder whether 
investment arbitration provides an adequate forum to address important non-
economic concerns. Furthermore, the mere possibility of a dispute with a 
                                                                                                                               
The Convention will enter into force six months after the deposit of the third instrument of 
ratification. The list of the parties to the Convention as well as signatories is available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention_
status.html. 
134 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter NY Convention]. 
135 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
other States, Mar.18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
136 Id. at art. 52.  
137 NY Convention, supra note 134, at art. 5. 
138 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 70 (Vaughan 
Lowe ed., 2007). 
139 M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign 
Investment 12 CAN. FOR. POL’Y. 2, 2–10 (2003). 
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powerful investor can exert a chilling effect on governments’ actions to regulate 
in the public interest.140 
III 
THE RISE OF INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS CONCERNING 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
Despite the economic importance of pharmaceutical patents, and the 
flourishing of arbitrations concerning them among private parties, known patent 
investment disputes have been rare.141 Only recently has this situation started to 
change.142 The few known pharmaceutical patent arbitrations have been high 
profile disputes that raise a number of important questions. How much does 
investment arbitration limit the regulatory autonomy of states? What is the 
interplay between investment arbitration and the parallel WTO DSM? Does 
investment arbitration allow adjudicators to strike an optimal equilibrium 
between private and public interests characterizing pharmaceutical patents? This 
part examines the reasons for the traditional paucity of cases and the recent rise 
of investor-state arbitrations concerning pharmaceuticals. Part IV explores the 
substantive issues raised by such arbitrations, highlighting the emergence of a 
new dialectics between the public and private interests embedded in intellectual 
property rights.  
Several factors may have accounted for the relative paucity of patent-
related investor-state arbitrations. Firstly, the available data could represent just 
the tip of the iceberg, given the investment arbitration’s limited transparency. 
While ICSID makes the existence of all proceedings public and generally 
                                         
140 See generally Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View 
from Political Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 607 
(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); Stuart G. Gross, Inordinate Chill: BITS, Non-
NAFTA MITS, and Host-state Regulatory Freedom: An Indonesian Case Study, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 893, 960 (2003) (examining a case where Indonesia repealed a regulation protecting 
forests after the threat of an investment treaty arbitration). But see Jeremy Caddel & Nathan 
M. Jensen, Which Host Country Government Actors are Most Involved in Disputes with 
Foreign Investors?, in COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES No. 120 at 1, 2 (Karl P. Sauvant & 
Shawn Lim eds., 2014) (“Given the low rate of disputes involving legislative branch activity, 
arguments that investor-state arbitration may encroach on the legitimate prerogatives of 
domestic governments appear to be overstated. Instead, democratic legislatures should 
embrace investor state arbitration as an additional check on executive branch misbehavior.”).  
141  LUKAS VANHONNAEKER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENTS: FROM COLLISION TO COLLABORATION VII (2015) (noting “a relative paucity of 
cases”). 
142 For a comprehensive analysis of the pharmaceutical patent-related arbitrations see 
infra Part IV. 
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encourages the publication of awards, 143  other arbitral institutions do not 
necessarily disclose their dockets, and even when they do so, they do not 
publish the awards unless the parties so agree.144 Moreover, the existence of ad 
hoc arbitrations could remain unknown.  
Secondly, it takes time for parties to switch to this new forum. Although 
the first BIT providing for investor-state arbitration was signed in 1959,145 only 
during the 1990’s did investment arbitration clearly emerge as an international 
mechanism of adjudicative review.146 The first investment treaty arbitration was 
registered in 1987.147 Since then, the flow of investment treaty claims has 
increased remarkably, 148  totaling 608 as of the year 2015.149  Traditionally, 
parties preferred other fora for claims concerning pharmaceutical patents. 
National courts are always an option to foreign investors.150 As pharmaceutical 
patents are territorial in nature, they are subject to the national laws of each 
individual country.151 At the regional level, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has adjudicated several cases dealing with IP in general and 
pharmaceutical patents in particular. Even human rights courts can and have 
adjudicated IP-related cases. For instance, the European Commission of Human 
                                         
143 ICSID Convention, supra note 135, at art. 48(5) (“The Centre shall not publish the 
award without the consent of the parties.”); ICSID, Admin. and Financial Regs., supra note 
131, at 66, (“The Secretary-General shall appropriately publish information about the 
operation of the Centre, including the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration 
and in due course an indication of the date and method of the termination of each proceeding. 
If both parties to a proceeding consent to the publication of . . . arbitral awards; or the 
minutes and other records of proceedings, the Secretary-General shall arrange for the 
publication thereof, in an appropriate form with a view to furthering the development of 
international law in relation to investments.”). 
144 See, e.g., The Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Rules of the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, art. 46, (Jan. 2010), http:// 
www.sccinstitute.se/filearchive/1/13207/1999_web_a4_vanliga_2004_eng_rev_2005.pdf. 
145 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959, 457 
U.N.T.S. 24. 
146 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121, 124 
(2006). 
147 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/87/3, Award, at 527 (June 27 1990). 
148 LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 7 (2d 
ed. 2011). 
149 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2007: 
Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, xi, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2007 (July 2007). 
150 VADI, supra note 54, at 51. 
151 Helfer, supra note 57, at 314 (“National patent laws are exclusively territorial in 
scope.”). 
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Rights (ECoHR) has deemed that IP is a form of property and thus protected 
under Article 1 of the first Protocol of the Convention.152 Finally, at the 
international level, the WTO has an additional DSM for cases in which a state 
violates its commitments under the TRIPS Agreement.153   
Thirdly, investment disputes take many years to complete and are 
extremely expensive—often more expensive than dispute resolutions at national 
and regional fora.154 Thus, initiating an investment dispute may prove to be a 
suitable option only for large corporate actors that have the resources to fund 
multi-year, multi-million dollar disputes.  
Finally, investment lawyers may lack sufficient knowledge about 
intellectual property.155 For a long time, investment disputes focused mainly on 
tangible assets,156 while intellectual property was considered to be “a highly 
technical subject.”157 Conversely, IP lawyers may lack sufficient knowledge 
about international investment law. The lack of knowledge and familiarity on 
                                         
152 See, e.g., Anheuser Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R. (holding that 
intellectual property undeniably attracts the protection of Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1). See 
generally, Henning Grosse Ruse–Khan, Overlaps and Conflict Norms in Human Rights Law: 
Approaches of European Courts to Address Intersections with Intellectual Property Rights, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Christopher 
Geiger ed., 2014). 
153 See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 25. 
154 Although alternative dispute mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation have been 
traditionally described as cheaper than litigation, this is not always the case, especially with 
regard to investment disputes, where legal fees and expenses are extremely high. See 
Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 9 GLOBAL ARB. 
REV. 2 (2014) (“[T]he average party costs were quite similar, at $4,437,000 for claimants and 
$4,559,000 for respondents.”); Tamara L. Slater, Investor-State Arbitration and Domestic 
Environmental Protection, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 131, 147 (2015) (noting that 
“[i]n international arbitration, the monetary cost is often millions of dollars.”). The cost 
variation depends on jurisdiction. See generally International Bar Association, Intellectual 
Property and Entertainment Law Committee, International Survey of Specialised Intellectual 
Property Courts and Tribunals (Sep. 2007) (determining, country by country, the level of 
effectiveness of the judicial system in its ability to settle IP disputes). 
155 Valentina Vadi, Mapping Uncharted Waters: Intellectual Property Disputes with 
Public Health Elements in Investor-State Arbitration, 2 TRANSN’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 6 (2009) 
[hereinafter Vadi, Mapping Uncharted Waters]. 
156 See, e.g., AHS Niger and Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. v. Republic of Niger, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/11, Award, at 15 (July 2013) (where Niger was found liable for 
expropriation of airport services concession, but no damages due for subsequent “misuse” of 
intellectual property). 
157 See Vadi, Mapping Uncharted Waters, supra note 155 (referring to David Vaver, Does 
the Public Understand Intellectual Property? Do Lawyers? (Univ. of Oxford Faculty of Law 
& Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 23/2006, 2006)). 
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the part of investment and IP lawyers may disincentivize them from advising 
their clients to pursue investment disputes for their IP rights. 
However, patent holders have started filing investment treaty arbitrations 
to protect their rights. There are several reasons for this change. First, 
investment treaty arbitration allows the investor to file a claim against the host 
state directly without the home state’s intervention.158 The private party can 
control the litigation strategy,159 and obtain compensation for the host state’s 
past wrongs. 160  In contrast to the mechanism afforded by investor-state 
arbitration, the ICJ and the WTO dispute settlement systems are inter-state 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 161  Recourse to these dispute settlement 
mechanisms is exercised at the discretion of the home state of the private party 
and requires the exercise of diplomatic protection. 162  However, diplomatic 
protection constitutes a prerogative and not a duty for states, and they may 
                                         
158 HEGE ELISABETH KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (2013) (noting that “the 
sanctioning of the host state behaviour no longer depends on the discretionary intervention by 
the investor’s home state.”). 
159 BARTON LEGUM, Investment Treaty Arbitration: An Option Not to Be Overlooked, in 
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 189, 190 (Barton Legum ed., 2005) 
(stressing that “in a significant innovation, [investment treaties] allowed the foreign investor 
to initiate and control prosecution of the arbitration, without having to rely on its state to 
bring the treaty case for it.”). 
160 Arbitral tribunals have held states liable to compensate investors for breaches of treaty 
standards that result in injury, relying on a case involving a Chorzów, Poland factory. See, 
e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 238 (May 24, 2004). The Chorzów Factory case involved the German 
government seeking damages for harm sustained by two German companies caused by acts 
of the Polish government. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 17, at 47 (Sep. 13) (judgment on the merits) (holding that “reparation must, as far as 
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”).  
161 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), Jun. 26, 1946, 8 U.N.T.S. 993 
(“Only state[s] may be parties in cases before the [International] Court [of Justice].”); see 
also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 123, at 132–69 
(describing the nature and scope of ICJ jurisdiction); Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik 
& Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 
INT’L ORG. 457, 463 (2000) (referring to “the GATT and WTO panels” and the ICJ as 
“interstate tribunals . . . in which only member states may file suit against one another.”). 
162 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5). In a more recent case, the Court has recognized the residual nature of the 
exercise of diplomatic protection and recourse to the Court in case of investment disputes. 
Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2007 I.C.J. 582, ¶ 
88–91 (May 24) (Preliminary Objections). 
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exercise it at their will.163 While companies lobby their governments to file 
disputes before the WTO DSM, it is up to the states to decide whether to bring a 
claim.164 The home state may be reluctant to initiate a trade dispute because of 
political and diplomatic considerations, especially when the alleged IP violation 
is limited in scope.165 Even when the home state does bring an ICJ or WTO 
claim, governments are generally more wary in promoting interpretations of 
international law that could limit their own regulatory freedom in the future.166 
An investor would exercise limited, if any, control over the dispute settlement 
strategy. Moreover, under an ICJ or WTO dispute, the state would be under no 
obligation to pay any reparation to the IP owners who were actually injured.167 
Remedies under the WTO DSM 168  have only a prospective character. 169 
                                         
163 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 589 (7th ed. 2014) (“There is under 
international law no obligation for states to provide diplomatic protection for their nationals 
abroad.”). 
164 See generally Petros C. Mavroidis et al., Panel Discussion, Is the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism Responsive to the Needs of the Traders? Would a System of Direct 
Action by Private Parties Yield Better Results?, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 14 (1998) 147–165 
(discussing the questions whether the WTO DSM is responsive to the traders’ economic 
interests and whether a system of direct action would better serve those interests); Joel P. 
Trachtman & P.M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement: Whose Right is it Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (2003) (analyzing the role of 
private actors in the WTO DSM); A. Catbagan, Rights of Action for Private Non-State Actors 
in the WTO Disputes Settlement System, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 279, 302 (2008) 
(proposing the institutionalization of direct action by private parties). 
165 CHRISTINA L DAVIS, SETTING THE NEGOTIATION TABLE 21 (2005) (“Low-profile issues 
that do not have a strong interest group on either side … are unlikely to rise to the level of 
adjudication. A government will be reluctant to initiate the formal adjudication process if 
there is not a strong interest group with sufficient political and economic interests to gather 
the backing for a formal dispute complaint. Government officials rely on interest groups to 
provide the background information to help select and prepare trade dispute cases.”). 
166 Sean Flynn, How the Leaked TPP ISDS Chapter Threatens Intellectual Property 
Limitations and Exceptions, INTELLECTUALPROPERTYWATCH.ORG, (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/03/26/how-the-leaked-tpp-isds-chapter-threatens-intellectual-
property-limitations-and-exceptions/. 
167  MARTIN DIXON, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE & SARAH WILLIAMS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (5th ed. 2011) (noting that “[b]ecause a State 
brings an international claim for its own injury, it is neither under an obligation to exercise 
diplomatic protection nor to pay any reparation (including compensation) received by it to the 
national actually injured.”). 
168 See generally DSU. 
169  Geraldo Vidigal, Re-Assessing WTO Remedies: The Prospective and the 
Retrospective, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 505, 505 (2013) (noting the “World Trade Organization 
(WTO) system of ‘prospective’ or ‘forward-looking’ remedies” and highlighting “their 
different functions when contrasted to reparation: inducing compliance ex post, rather than 
discouraging it ex ante.”). 
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Inversely proportional to the decrease of patent disputes at the DSM,170 the 
number of patent investor-state arbitrations has arisen. 171  While the 
effectiveness of the DSM is under dispute,172 the recent rise of IP-related 
investment disputes may indicate a shift of forum.173 
Second, investment arbitration may be a suitable choice when the host 
state’s judiciary does not seem to ensure fair trials or impartiality. In such 
circumstances, the foreign investor may immediately refer the dispute to 
arbitration.174 Alternatively, the investor-state arbitration may constitute the last 
resort when the case has already been discussed at the national level and the 
foreign investor is unsatisfied with the result for reasons such as perceived 
discrimination and denial of justice.175  
Third, the dispute settlement chapters of a number of Free Trade 
Agreements provide for the option of filing non-violation complaints for IP 
rights,176 which is not currently possible under the TRIPS Agreement. Non-
                                         
170  Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum 
Standards Agreements, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 868, 879 (2008) (noting that “the use of the 
WTO DSM to resolve TRIPS disputes has fallen, while its use to resolve general trade 
disputes continues unabated.”). 
171 But see Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 20, 2000) (holding that the TRIPS permits generic producers to 
manufacture a given pharmaceutical during the life of the patent; only stockpiling is deemed 
incompatible with Article 30); Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS5O/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
172 Fukunaga, supra note 170 (noting “there remain questions regarding the effectiveness 
of the WTO DSM in the TRIPS context.”). 
173 States have increasingly settled potential IP-related disputes. Id. at 888–889 (noting 
that “more than half of the disputes concerning TRIPS were settled within the consultation 
process through a mutually agreed solution.”). The TRIPS Council may have helped in 
reducing the number of IP-related disputes. Id. at 894, 897 (noting that “[t]he Council’s 
effectiveness as a monitoring body might be working to preempt potential disputes well 
before they would reach the DSM.”). In fact, discussion of given issues before the Council 
allows member states to explain, discuss and eventually adjust their regulatory measures. 
174 However, in case of denial of justice claims, the exhaustion of local remedies is 
needed. 
175 See generally Michael Goldhaber, The Rise of Arbitral Power Over Domestic Courts, 
1 STAN. J. OF COMPLEX LITIG. 373, 375 (2013) (tracing the doctrinal evolution of the denial of 
justice doctrine and discussing the rise of arbitral power over domestic courts more 
generally.). 
176 GATT, supra note 77, at art. 23(1)(b), (c) (“If any contracting party should consider 
that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the 
result of . . . (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation, the 
contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written 
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violation complaints are geared toward state measures that do not appear to 
directly violate treaty provisions but are nevertheless sufficiently 
disadvantageous to the investor’s IP. The aim of the provision is to maintain the 
balance of benefits struck during negotiations and transfer from the treaty-
negotiating parties to arbitral panels the authority to decide when the investor 
has suffered enough disadvantage. There are indications that non-violation 
complaints have already been raised before investment tribunals. 177  Non-
violation complaints about IP regulation were controversial during the TRIPS 
negotiations and remain so.178 While the TRIPS Agreement provides for such 
remedies,179 WTO Members have adopted a moratorium and agreed not to use 
non-violation complaints. 180  This is because non-violation complaints were 
historically used in GATT to address situations that were not specifically 
covered by the vague obligations of the agreement.181 Therefore, they were not 
needed in the TRIPS context, in which member states’ obligations had been 
more clearly detailed in international conventions including the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Paris Convention.182  
                                                                                                                               
representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be 
concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the 
representations or proposals made to it.”). See generally Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-
Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023 
(2009). 
177 Luke Eric Peterson, Newly Disclosed Document Shows that Pharma Corp Hopes to 
Construe Alleged Non-Compliance with Patent Treaties as a Breach of Investment Treaty, 
INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. 10, 2012). 
178  Haochen Sun, TRIPS and Non-Violation Complaints From a Public Health 
Perspective, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. AT HARV. UNIV. 5 (2002), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ 
cidtrade/Papers/Sun-TRIPS.pdf (“During the TRIPS negotiations in particular, there was 
significant disagreement regarding the inclusion of a provision on non-violation in the 
context of intellectual property disputes,” and that “[t]he potential application of the non-
violation remedy to the TRIPS Agreement remains controversial.”).  
179 TRIPS Agreement art. 64.2. 
180 The 9th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Bali, Indonesia (3–7 December 2013) 
reiterated the moratorium until its next session to be held in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 
2015. The United States and Switzerland have asked for reconsideration of this issue, and the 
TRIPS Council is examining the scope and modalities for non-violation complaints. Press 
Release, WTO, Intellectual Property Meeting Mulls Irish Tobacco Plan, Drug Tariffs, Sport, 
Non-Violation (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/trip_10oct13 
_e.htm#nonviolation. 
181 ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, 7 (1993) 7 (noting that the non-violation procedure allows, 
to a certain extent, “the closing-up of a loophole in substantive law, offering the possibility of 
maintaining the balance of interests even in cases where the substantive law dose not cover 
the issues at hand”). 
182 Paris Convention, supra note 65. 
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Finally, the increasing use of investment arbitration for settling patent-
related disputes may reflect the growing importance of “intellectual capital” as a 
source of wealth generation vis-à-vis other forms of capital investment in 
industries such as the extractive industries, and manufacturing. Ideas play a vital 
role in modern economies. 183  Science, technology, and creativity generate 
economic value and increase the significance of intellectual property184 as useful 
tools to incentivize creativity and technological development on as well as 
enhance access to technology.185  
IV 
TOWARDS A NEW DIALECTICS: PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS, PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS 
In recent years, a growing number of investor-state arbitrations have 
concerned the way host states govern the pharmaceutical sector. Arbitrations 
have been filed against both industrialized and developing countries in different 
continents, indicating that the phenomenon has a truly global scale.186 The rise 
of patent-related investment arbitrations highlights the emergence of a new 
battlefield between the public and private interests. Investment arbitrations 
provide a new place of dialectical interaction between the private interests of the 
patent holders and the public interest of the host states in preserving access to 
medicines and ensuring the safety and effectiveness of given pharmaceutical 
products.  
Some of these arbitrations are related to states’ regulatory measures in the 
patent system.187 For instance, the first known investment arbitration dealing 
with pharmaceutical patents, Signa S.A. v. Canada, 188 challenged Canada’s 
patent regulations. Signa, a Mexican generic pharmaceutical company, 
contended that the regulations governing the authorization process violated the 
                                         
183 Christopher S. Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration: Do International 
Investment Agreements Provide New Means to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights?, Y.B. 
ON INT’L INV. LAW & POL’Y 397, 398 (2010) [hereinafter Gibson, Latent Grounds in 
Investor-State Arbitration] (noting that modern economies have become “predominantly 
‘conceptual,’ reflecting the vital role of ideas in … products and services.”). 
184 Id. at 398. 
185 Id. at 412. 
186 These arbitrations are showcased in the subsections below, which distinguish and 
categorize them on the basis of the claims articulated by the claimants.  
187  See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Co. v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/14/2, http://www.italaw.com/cases/1625. 
188 Signa S.A. v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to 
Arbitration Under Section B of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Mar. 4, 1996), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ 
assets/pdfs/disp-diff/signa-01.pdf. 
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fair and equitable treatment standard under Article 1105 of the NAFTA.189 
Signa established a joint venture with the Canadian company Apotex, Inc. for 
the production of a generic version of Bayer’s top-selling ciprofloxacin 
hydrochloride, an antibiotic that treats a number of bacterial infections.190 In 
order to sell the pharmaceutical in Canada, an authorization was required by the 
relevant authorities. 191  According to the claimant, the relevant regulations 
provided that “by merely purporting to have a relevant patent, a person c[ould] 
obtain a mandatory prohibition against a generic competitor for a period of 
about 3 years.”192 Because Bayer, the patent holder company, prevented Apotex 
and Signa from making ciprofloxacin hydrochloride for a period of about three 
years, Signa claimed loss of revenues and market share.193 As the parties quickly 
settled this case, there is no publicly available information on the dispute and 
whether the filing of the Notice of Intent to Arbitrate had any strategic or other 
impact is not known. Nonetheless, the case is significant because it shows that 
foreign investors can challenge patent regulation governing the duration of 
patent protection and even the authorization processes. 
Other arbitration disputes relate to various issues, ranging from the 
regulation of competition law to the implementation of harmonization measures 
in the pharmaceutical sector required by the European Union. For instance, 
Uruguay is reportedly facing an arbitration claim over a recent decree that limits 
the concentration of ownership in Uruguay’s pharmacy sector. 194  A U.S. 
investment fund has filed Notices of Dispute pursuant to the Spain–Uruguay 
and U.S.–Uruguay BITs respectively, alleging that the decree harms the 
company’s recent investment in a chain of local pharmacies.195 In parallel, the 
Servier v. Poland case arose because of regulatory measures adopted by Poland 
to implement EU law harmonizing pharmaceutical regulations.196  
By including IP within their ambit, IIAs restrict the regulatory autonomy 
of states in the pharmaceutical sector, potentially affecting fundamental public 
                                         
189 Id. ¶¶ 4, 12. 
190 Id. ¶¶ 1–3. 
191 Id. ¶ 4. 
192 Id. ¶ 6. 
193 Id. ¶ 9. 
194  Luke Eric Peterson, Uruguay Threatened over Decree Affecting Ownership of 




196  Luke Eric Peterson, France’s Second Largest Pharmaceutical Company Quietly 
Pursues Arbitration Against Republic of Poland, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER (Aug. 
19, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/frances-second-largest-pharmaceutical-
company-quietly-pursues-arbitration-against-republic-of-poland/. 
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interests. These disputes give rise to both jurisdictional and substantive issues. 
First, some disputes will center on the jurisdictional issue of which economic 
activities amount to an investment, giving rise to an arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over the dispute.197 Second, some investment disputes are concerned 
with whether or not a certain state action constitutes an unlawful expropriation 
of the patent right.198 Third, if an expropriation has occurred, claims may 
concern the adequacy of the amount or form of compensation.199 Fourth, the 
patent owner may also allege violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.200 Finally, some claims may concern alleged discrimination suffered 
by the foreign investor in violation of national treatment and most favoured 
nation treatment.201 This article examines each of these claims.  
While it is too early to predict how relevant arbitral tribunals will 
adjudicate these cases, such disputes highlight the emergence of an additional 
litigation venue, i.e. investment treaty arbitration, for resolving pharmaceutical 
patent-related disputes. International investment agreements enable private 
companies to file claims against the host states directly without the intervention 
of the home state and to recover damages and loss of profits; they 
internationalize a given dispute, isolating it from the oversight of the domestic 
courts of the host state.  
At the same time, these new dialectics require the elaboration of new 
procedural, substantive and interpretive legal tools for recalibrating the 
expectations, entitlements and powers of the litigating parties. In fact, at the 
procedural level, investment treaty arbitration may not be adequate to enable 
arbitrators to strike an optimal equilibrium between public and private interests. 
As IP disputes can affect important public values, these arbitrations and the 
relevant awards should be disclosed to the public. Moreover, at the substantive 
level, arbitrators may not have in-depth expertise of IP law and the underlying 
policy considerations. The risk is that an inadequate appreciation of the policies 
underlying IP rights by adjudicators may lead to an overemphasis of the private 
interests and an under-emphasis of the public interests. The propertization of 
patents, i.e. conceiving them as mere assets, may lead interpreters to forget that 
they are based on a compromise between public and private interests.202 As the 
substantive interplay between IP and international investment law remains 
                                         
197 See infra Section IV. A.  
198 See infra Section IV. B. 
199 See infra Section IV. B.  
200 See infra Section IV. D.  
201 See infra Section IV. E. 
202 See Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 66, at 3–4 (pinpointing the reconceptualization of 
IP by international law). 
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uncharted,203 and the functioning of investment treaty obligations with regard to 
IP, the parties’ expectations, and enforcement aspects of these treaties are 
largely unexplored.204 Interpretation is crucial to striking an appropriate balance 
between private and public interests. The next subsections provide an overview 
of the existing patent-related investment disputes and are organized by issues 
that may arise in arbitration. 
A.  The Notion of Investment 
International investment agreements are “agreements concluded between 
states for the promotion and protection of reciprocal investments.” 205 
Addressing the question as to whether certain economic activities relating to 
pharmaceutical products amount to an investment is crucial to establishing an 
arbitral tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction. A patent holder is entitled to the 
substantive and procedural protections afforded by the treaty only if the treaty 
classifies her as an “investor” or her economic activity as an “investment”. If a 
given economic activity—in casu, a pharmaceutical patent—constitutes a 
protected investment, the patent holder will benefit from the substantive 
protections of the applicable IIA.  
In order to ascertain whether pharmaceutical patents constitute a form of 
protected investment under a given IIA, one has to look at the specific text of 
the applicable treaty. If the parties have opted for resolving their dispute at the 
ICSID, the ICSID Convention will be also applicable, which extends 
jurisdiction “to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.”206 In this 
situation, the adjudicators will have to determine whether a given economic 
activity constitutes an investment under both the ICSID Convention and the 
applicable IIA. Patents are usually considered a form of investment under the 
ICSID Convention and most IIAs. 
                                         
203 For a seminal study, see Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship 
Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT.’L L. 163 (1998). 
204 Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the 
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1124 (2014) 
[hereinafter Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?] (noting that “[a]lthough the 
definition of ‘investment’ contained in most investment treaties mention intellectual property, 
the obligations, expectations, and enforcement aspects of these treaties are largely 
undeveloped.”). 
205 Boie, supra note 2, at 4 (defining IIAs – a term encompassing both “bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and FTAs or Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) with investment 
chapters” – as “agreements concluded between states for the promotion and protection of 
reciprocal investments.”). 
206 ICSID Convention, supra note 135, at art. 25(1). 
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The ICSID Convention does not provide a definition of investment.207 
Rather, it stipulates that ICSID jurisdiction extends “to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment.”208 In practice this has meant that commentators 
and arbitral tribunals have elaborated a number of criteria for defining the 
term.209 Most notably, the leading test was articulated by Salini v. Morocco, 
which involves a dispute arising out of the construction of a highway. The 
Salini test includes four elements: 1) a contribution of money or other assets of 
economic value; 2) a certain duration; 3) an element of risk; and 4) a 
contribution to the host state’s development.210 In general terms, tribunals allow 
the consideration of pharmaceutical patents as a form of investment. First, 
pharmaceutical patents are assets of economic value, with a duration of twenty 
years. Second, creating a medicine involves an element of risk, as it may take 
years of research and development. Finally, the availability of pharmaceutical 
products—which goes hand in hand with the protection of pharmaceutical 
patents—can improve the public health of a given country, and albeit indirectly, 
to its economic development. These requirements embody a balance between 
the private interests of foreign companies and the public interest of the host 
state, because they ensure that economic activities are protected as long as they 
contribute to the economic development of the host state.  
However, given the vagueness of the ICSID Convention, the definition of 
investment provided by the applicable IIA will often be decisive for 
ascertaining whether a given activity constitutes an investment, because the 
                                         
207  Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment Under the ICSID Convention: A 
Defense of Salini, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287, 293 (2014) (noting that “[t]he signatories to the 
[ICSID] convention purposefully left the term ‘investment’ undefined when granting the 
body jurisdiction over matters of international investment.”). 
208 ICSID Convention, supra note 135, at art. 25(1). 
209 Grabowski, supra note 207, at 293 (noting that “[a] variety of tribunals have applied a 
plethora of different tests …. ”). 
210 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 23, 2001). The need for the last element, the 
contribution to the economic development of the host state, is sometimes put in doubt. See 
L.E.S.I.–DIPENTA v. République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, (July 12, 2006); Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States (Apotex III), ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 7.62 (Aug. 25, 2014) (holding that it did not seem necessary 
that the investment contribute to the economic development of the country; according to the 
Tribunal, the contribution to economic development was difficult to establish, and was 
implicitly covered by the other three elements of an investment); Quiborax v. Bolivia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 220 (Sept. 27, 2012) (arguing that while the 
ICSID Convention attempts to foster economic development via international investment, 
such development is not a necessary element of investment). 
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specific languages of the IIAs are frequently given deference.211 In Servier v. 
Poland,212 a dispute concerning the commercialization of pharmaceuticals in 
Poland, the Tribunal upheld its jurisdiction notwithstanding Poland’s 
opposition.213 According to Poland, the presence of Servier subsidiaries in 
Poland did not entitle Servier to recover,214 as the claimants did not have any 
investments in the host state itself under Polish law.215 Servier counter-argued 
that “it [wa]s the Treaty, not Polish law, that [wa]s relevant in assessing whether 
Servier’s assets [we]re protected investments.”216 The Tribunal held that it 
possessed jurisdiction, acknowledging that the companies were incorporated in 
France, thus being foreign investors, and therefore it had jurisdiction ratione 
personae.217  
It usually requires a case-by-case analysis to determine whether IP 
constitutes an investment218 because different IIAs provide different definitions 
of investment. BITs do not include detailed regulation of pharmaceutical 
patents. Rather, they briefly mention IP rights as a form of protected 
investment.219 Some IIAs incorporate a broad definition of investment that 
generally covers both tangible and intangible property.220 Other IIAs either 
                                         
211 Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment (Apr. 16, 2009). 
212 Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S., Biofarma, S.A.S., Arts et Techniques du Progrès v. 
Republic of Poland, Award, ¶¶ 515, 532 (Feb. 14, 2012).  
213 Id. ¶ 190 (noting that Servier did not plead that the marketing authorizations were a 
protected investment). 
214 Id. ¶ 206. 
215 Id. ¶ 222. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. ¶ 510, 518. 
218 Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 204, at 1126. 
219 Id. (noting that “[s]uch agreements usually protect intellectual property by including it 
in the definition of investment.”). Conversely, FTAs often include a distinct chapter for 
governing intellectual property. See id. (highlighting that “[t]he fact in RTAs, that several 
subject matters, including both investment and IP, are covered in one single agreement may 
have significant consequences for the interplay of these provisions”). IP chapters providing 
for higher standards of IP protection than those provided by the TRIPS Agreement are known 
as ‘TRIPS-plus.’ See Beatrice Lindstrom, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of 
Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implications for Asia and the 
Pacific, NYU J. OF INT’L L. AND POL. 917, 919 (2010) (noting that “[o]ver the past ten years, 
a new trend has developed in which bilateral trade agreements mandate changes to domestic 
intellectual property laws, resulting in laws that exceed the standards agreed to at the WTO. 
These agreements are referred to as ‘TRIPS-plus.’”) A complete analysis of the interactions 
between the investment and IP chapters of FTAs is outside the scope of this article.  
220 For instance, Article 1139(g) of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
states “investment” includes “real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in 
the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes.” 
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generally refer to IP rights, or explicitly indicate the types of IP covered, such as 
copyright, patents, industrial designs, trade secrets, trademarks and others.221  
A question that often arises is whether patent applications are covered 
investments under the relevant investment treaty. Although registered patents 
are covered in most investment treaties, it remains an open question as to 
whether patent applications should be deemed a form of protected investment 
even if they are not entitled to the same protections as a patent itself.222 Certain 
IIAs expressly exclude the possibility that patent applications constitute 
protected investments.223 Other investment treaty provisions protecting “rights 
with respect to [IP]”224 or “patentable inventions” leave much uncertainty.225 For 
instance, the U.S.–Jamaica BIT covers patentable inventions and therefore 
should cover patent applications as investments. 226  Other IIAs protect 
                                                                                                                               
North American Free Trade Agreement, signed on 17 December 1992, in force on 1 January 
1994, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993). 
221  See, e.g., the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Dominican 
Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (CH-Cuba BIT), art. 1.2(d) (stating 
that “[t]he term ‘investments’ shall include every kind of asset, in particular, though not 
exclusively: … copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents, utility models, 
industrial designs or models, trade or service marks, trade names, indications of origin), 
technical processes, know-how and goodwill”). The first BIT, signed between West Germany 
and Pakistan in 1959, included “patents and technical knowledge” in the definition of 
“investment.” Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., art. 8(1)(a), 
Nov. 25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 (affirming that “[t]he term ‘investment’ shall comprise 
capital brought into the territory of the other Party for investment in various forms in the 
shape of assets such as foreign exchange, goods, property rights, patents and technical 
knowledge.”). 
222 Liberti, supra note 117, at 8 (“A first issue regarding the scope of the definition of 
investment is whether patent applications, though not an IPR, would qualify as an intangible 
property.”). 
223 See, e.g., 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, art. 4(c) (limiting an 
“investment” to “intellectual property rights which are conferred pursuant to the laws and 
regulations of each Member State.”). 
224 Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Austl.-H.K., art 1(e)(iv), Sep. 15, 1993, 1748 
U.N.T.S. 385; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Can., art. 
1(a)(iv), May 11, 1991, 2467 U.N.T.S. 97. 
225 Treaty Between the United States of America and Jamaica Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection Investment, Jam.-U.S., art. I.1(a)(iv), Feb. 2, 1994, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 103–35. 
226 Id. (stating that “[f]or the purposes of this Treaty, (a) ‘investment’ means every kind of 
investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals 
or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; 
and includes without limitation: … (iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights 
relating to: literary and artistic works, including sound recordings, patentable inventions, 
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“intangible property” and arguably this generic notion can include patent 
applications. 227  As patent applications can be sold and assigned to third 
parties,228 the argument goes that they are a form of “intangible property,” even 
though they do not constitute “intellectual” property.229 The European Court of 
Human Rights held that both registered trademarks and applications to register 
trademarks were “property rights” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.230 The fact, however, that 
most investment treaties provide protection to both investors and their 
investments only after the establishment of an investment suggests that a case-
by-case analysis is needed. 
Recently in Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States (Apotex III), a Tribunal 
held that patent applications were not investments under NAFTA Chapter 11.231 
The claimants sought over $1 billion in damages from the United States232 after 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) imposed an Import Alert on 
certain generic medicines that were produced in Canada by Apotex Inc., 
exported to the U.S. and sold in that market by a U.S.-based Apotex 
subsidiary.233 According to the respondent, the FDA issued the alert after its 
inspections of Apotex facilities in Canada found “significant violations of U.S. 
laws and regulations.”234 The United States emphasized that Apotex produced 
all of its products in Canada,235 and argued that the cross-border trade of 
pharmaceuticals did not constitute an investment.236 The claimants argued that 
                                                                                                                               
industrial designs, semiconductor mask works, trade secrets and confidential business 
information, and trademarks, service marks, and trade names.”). 
227 See generally Liberti, supra note 117. 
228  Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in 
International Investment Agreements, 15 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 871, 878 (2012) (“For instance, 
the value of the expected IPRs (and hence the expected profit to be derived from the IPRs) 
can be vast and easily quantifiable as, for instance, applications for a patent (and in some 
jurisdictions, applications for trademark) can be sold and assigned to third parties.”). 
229 Patents can only be acquired through registration. 
230 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2007).  
231 Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States (Apotex III), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, 
Award, ¶ 7.62 (Aug. 25, 2014).  
232 Id. ¶ 2.34. 
233 Id. ¶ 2.24. 
234 Id. ¶ 2.40. 
235 Id. ¶ 2.51 (“The Respondent submits that Apotex Inc. does not claim to manufacture 
or even test any drugs in the USA; nor does it assert the existence of any offices or employees 
in the USA; nor does it assert the existence of any offices or employees in the USA; it pays 
no taxes in the USA on its supposed investments (including its ANDA-related activities) 
....”). 
236 Id. ¶ 2.37 (contending that “the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the Parties’ 
dispute under NAFTA”; that “the Claimants’ complaint is in fact directed at a trade 
measure”; and that “the Claimants are seeking improperly in these proceedings to convert a 
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they had the following investments in the U.S.: 1) certain intellectual property 
rights, that is, abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs), directly held by 
Apotex Inc. and indirectly held by Apotex Holdings;237 and 2) Apotex Corp., a 
U.S.-based subsidiary of Apotex Holdings, that markets pharmaceuticals 
produced in Canada.238  
The Tribunal held that ANDAs were not “investments” in the United 
States.239 In this regard, the Tribunal followed previous awards (Apotex I and II) 
which rejected claims that applications for the sale of medicines into a host state 
could be considered investments.240 The Tribunal clarified that even if preparing 
those applications required significant expenses, the true business activity was 
the production of the medicines in the home state for export in the host state.241 
Therefore, the only investment was the subsidiary Apotex Corp. Commentators 
criticized the award on this latter point, submitting that it “blurs the line 
between trade and investment disputes,” and that companies might use their 
subsidiaries as a kind of “Trojan horse” for obtaining protection under the 
relevant BIT.242 
The mere sale of pharmaceutical products does not amount to an 
investment. Mere sales of goods do not have the prerequisites of a certain 
duration, risk and contribution to the economic development of the host state 
which characterize investments. Rather, such sales can “preserve export markets 
for the patent owner, leading to welfare losses for the host country,” potentially 
“impeding local innovation,” and increasing the costs of medicines. 243  As 
mentioned, IIAs reflect a bargain where the state restricts some of its sovereign 
rights to attract foreign investments. When the private party is not holding up 
her end of the bargain by taking risks and making a real contribution to the host 
state’s economy, such sales are not investments and are not entitled to the 
substantive protection of the IIA.  
                                                                                                                               
possible trade-related claim between NAFTA Contracting States (under NAFTA Chapter 
Twenty) into an investment claim by a foreign entity (under NAFTA Chapter Eleven).”). 
237 Id. ¶ 2.28. 
238 Id. ¶ 2.27. 
239 Id. ¶ 7.62. 
240 Apotex Inc. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
(June 14, 2013). 
241  Apotex III, ¶ 7.62. One of the three arbitrators dissented from the Tribunal’s 
conclusion. He suggested that approved ANDAs can be bought and sold and are in other 
ways treated as property under U.S. law. Id. ¶ 7.66. 
242 Lise Johnson, New Weaknesses: Despite a Major Win, Arbitration Decisions in 2014 
Increase the US’s Future Exposure to Litigation and Liability 4 (2015), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Brief-on-US-cases-Jan-14.pdf. 
243 Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 204, at 1126. 
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An arbitral tribunal recently clarified that the mere sale of medicines does 
not amount to an investment in Italy v. Cuba.244 Italy initiated this investment 
treaty arbitration arguing that the contractual agreement between Menarini, an 
Italian pharmaceutical company, and Medicuba, an entity affiliated with the 
Cuban Ministry of Health, was an investment protected under the Italy-Cuba 
BIT.245 According to the claimant, the agreement did not relate merely to the 
supply of medicines, but also included the research and development of new 
pharmaceutical products. 246  The claimant also stressed the duration of the 
contract, the collaboration with local agents, and the particular importance of 
the given medicines to public health in Cuba.247 The respondent counter-argued 
that Menarini was not an “investor” as it merely sold its products to Medicuba 
and had no subsidiary in Cuba.248 According to the respondent, contacts with 
local agents should be considered a normal business practice, and the 
organization of a cardiology conference was merely aimed at marketing related 
products and should not be conceived as evidence of an investment.249 Cuba 
concluded that it had reached an agreement with the company, according to 
which Cuba would have paid its invoices, while the company would have 
started its commercial operations with Medicuba again.250 After reaching the 
mentioned agreement with Cuba, Menarini ceased to invoke diplomatic 
protection. 251  In light of this circumstance, Italy withdrew its diplomatic 
protection.252 However, it did not withdraw the claim in its own name.253  
                                         
244 La Republique d’Italie v. La Republique de Cuba, UNCITRAL, Arbitrage ad hoc, 
Sentence Finale, ¶ 219 (Jan. 15, 2008). Italy espoused the claims of sixteen investors 
operating in different fields and raised claims in its own name for breach of the Italy-Cuba 
BIT. Id. at ¶ 46. It sought the payment of €1 from Cuba as symbolic compensation and of 
several millions of U.S. dollars as compensation for the injury suffered by its investors. Id. ¶ 
96(1)(e)(6). 
245 See, e.g., Enrico Milano, The Investment Arbitration between Italy and Cuba: The 
Application of Customary International Law under Scrutiny, 11 L. & PRACTICE OF INT’L CTS 
AND TRIBUNALS 424, 500 (2012) (defining this arbitration as “a landmark case … to the 
extent that it has constituted the first inter-State proceedings in the history of modern BITs.”) 
See generally Michele Potestà, Republic of Italy v. Republic of Cuba, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 
(2012). See also Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid 
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 
1 (2014). 
246 La Republique d’Italie v. La Republique de Cuba, UNCITRAL, Arbitrage ad hoc, 
Sentence Finale, ¶ 219 (Jan. 15, 2008). 
247 Id. ¶ 90. 
248 Id. ¶ 134. 
249 Id.  
250 Id. ¶ 136. 
251 Id. ¶ 39. 
252 Id. ¶ 39, n.1. 
253 Id. ¶ 93. In fact, Italy did still have standing to sue in its own name. 
2015] TOWARDS A NEW DIALECTICS 42 
 
The Tribunal found Menarini’s activities not an investment, and 
dismissed Italy’s claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its 
reasoning, the Tribunal defined investment as any economic activity carried out 
by an investor characterized by a contribution to the economic development of 
the host state, for a certain duration and involving commercial risks.254 After 
examining the contract between Menarini and Medicuba, tellingly entitled 
“Contrato de Compra-Venta” which translates to “Contract of Sale,”255 the 
Tribunal held that the given commercial activity was not an investment but a 
sale of pharmaceuticals. As there was neither contribution of resources into 
Cuba nor assumption of risk beyond the mere risk of nonpayment, the Tribunal 
held that such sale of medicines did not constitute an investment protected 
under the Italy–Cuba BIT.256 The Tribunal added that sponsoring medical 
congresses does not qualify the subsequent sales of medicines as investments, as 
such activity is a classic marketing practice.257  
To summarize, the question as to whether intellectual property constitutes 
an “investment” requires a case-by-case assessment. Mere sales of 
pharmaceuticals do not amount to investments. IIAs reflect a bargain—where 
the state gives up some of its sovereign rights in exchange for a better chance of 
attracting foreign investments. Arbitral tribunals have taken this bright-line rule 
that when it is mere sale of goods, the state is not gaining enough from the 
bargain and the investor is not contributing enough by taking risks or 
contributing to the economic development of the state.258 Patent applications 
create a mere expectation of obtaining a patent but do not constitute patents. 
                                         
254 La Republique d’Italie v. La Republique de Cuba, UNCITRAL, Arbitrage ad hoc, 
Sentence Finale, ¶ 81 (Jan. 15, 2008) (“sauf dispositions contraires spécifiques d'un Traité 
Bilatéral de protection des Investissements, trois éléments sont requis pour que l’on se trouve 
en présence d'un investissement: un apport, la durée et une prise de risque de la part de 
l’investisseur…. Ceci permet d'écarter, par exemple, les simples opérations de vente.”). 
255 Id. ¶ 215. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. ¶ 220 (clarifying that “… le fait que Menarini aurait sponsorisé des congres 
medicaux, ce qui n’est d’ailleurs pas etabli ne permet pas de qualifier d’investissement la 
vente des medicaments en cause, puisqu’il s’agit d’operations classiques de promotion des 
produits vendus.”). 
258 For instance, the sale of cattle was deemed not to constitute an investment in the 
Canadian Cattlemen case. In 2003, when the United States closed the U.S.–Canadian border 
to beef and cattle after a case of mad cow disease was discovered in Canada, a group of 
Canadian cattlemen brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 suit alleging that the U.S. discriminated 
against Canadian operators, because it allowed U.S. cattlemen who owned Canadian cattle to 
keep it, while stopping Canadian cattle (of Canadian operators) at the border. Thus, Canadian 
cattlemen requested damages for losses incurred during the border closure. The case was 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, 
UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction (28 Jan. 2008). 
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Although some argue that the application is a form of “intangible property”, the 
question as to whether a patent application can be considered an investment 
depends on the precise wording of the relevant IIA.259  Because the specific 
language of the treaty reflects the voluntary consent of the state involved, it can 
be presumed that the states have already taken the public interest into account 
when accepting to protect patent applications as forms of investments. 
Any determination of intellectual property as an “investment” in 
international investment law and arbitration has far-reaching policy 
implications. Firstly, the IIA language reflects a delicate balance between 
private and public interests. States can shape this balance when defining 
investment in their IIAs—a fine balance that is also intrinsic in the protection of 
pharmaceutical patents. Secondly, when arbitral tribunals determine whether an 
economic activity constitutes an investment, such determination can affect both 
foreign and domestic pharmaceutical companies.260 In fact, the tribunals’ awards 
could have effects reverberating beyond the parties to the given disputes. 
Although the rule of stare decisis, or binding precedent, does not apply to 
international arbitration and awards are binding only between the parties,261 
previous arbitral awards have influenced, if not shaped, much of contemporary 
investment law.262  
For example, if a patent application is considered to be a protected 
investment, private interests may receive a higher level of protection than they 
otherwise would be and the state regulatory autonomy will be restricted 
according to the relevant investment treaty provisions. By contrast, if a patent 
application is not considered to be a protected investment, private interests will 
receive a lower level of protection than they otherwise would, but the host state 
will preserve its regulatory autonomy. Therefore, it is crucial that when treating 
intellectual property as an “investment,” arbitrators should consider the precise 
wording of the applicable investment treaty and the underlying policy 
implications, 263  taking into account both private and public interests. The 
determination whether a certain economic activity constitutes an investment can 
                                         
259 Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 183, at 433. 
260 Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”?, supra note 204, at 1127 (noting that 
both investor and state “will be affected by any resulting welfare loss.”). 
261 See ICSID Convention, supra note 135, at art. 53 (stating that “The award shall be 
binding on the parties . . .”); see also NAFTA, supra note 16, at art. 1136(1) (providing that 
“an award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing 
parties and in respect of the particular case.”). 
262 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 
ARB. INT’L 357 (2007). 
263 Id. at 1136 (illustrating “the dangers of treating intellectual property as ‘investment’ 
per se, isolated from its appropriate policy domains.”). 
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affect the ability of the host state to calibrate national policies to local 
conditions and needs.  
B.  Expropriation 
International investment treaties provide, inter alia, for protection against 
unlawful expropriation.264 This raises two questions: whether a state action 
constitutes expropriation, and if it does, whether or not the expropriation is 
lawful. Several arbitrations have been concerned with the issues of what acts of 
the state amount to an expropriation. Treaty provisions lack a precise definition 
of expropriation, and their languages encompass a potentially wide variety of 
state activities that may interfere with pharmaceutical patents.265 Usually IIAs 
clarify that expropriatory measures are lawful if adopted: 1) for a public 
purpose; 2) on a non-discriminatory basis; 3) in accordance with due process of 
law; and 4) on payment of compensation.266 Failure to satisfy any of these 
requirements will imply that the expropriation is unlawful and thus requires 
compensation.  
Expropriation includes both direct and indirect expropriation. Direct 
expropriation of intellectual property is usually done through formal transfer of 
title or outright seizure of the same.267 This has happened in the past.268 For 
                                         
264 See Germany-Burundi BIT, supra note 3, at art. 2(4) (“Investment by nationals or 
companies of either Contracting Party shall not be expropriated, nationalized or subjected to 
any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalization in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for the public benefit and 
against compensation… The legality of any such expropriation, nationalization, or 
comparable measure and the amount of compensation shall be subject to review by due 
process of law.”); Fr.-Pol., art. 5(2), Feb. 14, 1989 (“The Contracting Parties shall not take 
any expropriation or nationalization measures or any other measures which would have the 
effect of divesting investors of the other Party, either directly or indirectly, of investments 
belonging to them in its territory or maritime areas, except for reasons of public necessity and 
on condition that these measures are not discriminatory or contrary to a specific undertaking. 
Any divestment measures that may be taken shall give rise to the payment of prompt and 
adequate compensation, the amount of which shall correspond to the real value of the 
investments in question on the day before the measures are taken or made known to the 
public ….”). 
265 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case ARB/98/4, Award, at ¶ 98 
(Dec. 8, 2000) (noting that “expropriation is not limited to tangible property rights.”). 
266 See NAFTA, supra note 16, at art. 1110.1.  
267  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2012, Expropriation: 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 6, 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 (“Direct expropriation means a mandatory legal transfer of the 
title to the property or its outright physical seizure. Normally, the expropriation benefits the 
State itself or a State-mandated third party.”). 
268 For instance, during the First World War, the German-owned Bayer trademark for 
aspirin was assigned to an unrelated US company. See Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: 
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instance, in German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice found that a Polish statute, which transferred to the Polish 
Treasury all the properties of the German Reich located in the territory annexed 
to Poland, expropriated not only the Chorzów factory, but also certain patents.269 
More recently, in Shell Brand International AG v. Nicaragua,270 two Shell 
subsidiaries filed a claim against the Government of Nicaragua for breach of the 
Netherlands–Nicaragua BIT in response to an alleged direct expropriation of 
their logo and brand name.271 According to the claimants, Nicaragua seized their 
trademarks in an effort to enforce a judgment of a Nicaraguan court.272 
Even without direct expropriation, a state action could nonetheless 
amount to indirect expropriation of a patent. Indirect expropriation indicates 
measures that do not directly take investment property but interfere with its use, 
depriving the owner of its economic benefit.273 For instance, several studies 
have examined the question as to whether compulsory licenses—when a 
government allows someone else to exploit the patented product or process 
without the consent of the patent owner—and parallel imports—importing and 
selling branded goods into a market without the consent of the patent owner—
can amount to an expropriation of pharmaceutical patents.274 Although the 
TRIPS Agreement permits compulsory licenses and parallel imports,275 the issue 
remains open as to whether they constitute indirect expropriation under 
                                                                                                                               
Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investment Protection Agreements and at the World 
Trade Organization, 23 CANADA–U.S. L.J. 261, 276 (1997). 
269 The Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Judgment, PCIJ Rep, Series A No. 7, at 
44 (May 25, 1926). 
270 Shell Brands International AG & Shell Nicaragua S.A. v. The Republic of Nicaragua, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/14, Request for Arbitration (May 17, 2006). 
271  Damon Vis-Dunbar, Shell Launches Claim against Nicaragua over Seizure of 
Intellectual Property, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2006) (noting that according to 
Shell, Nicaragua seized its trademarks in an effort to enforce a judgment handed down in 
2002 by a Nicaraguan court in Sonia Eduarda Franco Franco, et al. v. Dow Chemical, et al. 
That judgment was in favour of Nicaraguan citizens who claimed to have been affected by a 
pesticide, which was manufactured for use on banana plantations in the 1960s and 70s. As the 
case was withdrawn, very little information is available about the dispute.). 
272 Id. 
273  Brigitte Stern, In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 35 (Arthur Rovine 
ed., 2008). 
274 For an examination of the question as to whether compulsory licenses can amount to 
an indirect expropriation, see VADI, supra note 54, at 52–53, 76–80, 88–90; Christopher 
Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect 
Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 25 357 (2010); Carlos M. Correa, Investment 
Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements: Implications for the Granting of 
Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331 (2004). 
275 TRIPS Agreement arts. 6, 31. 
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investment agreements. So far no claims have been brought concerning these 
specific issues.276  
In Servier v. Poland, the Tribunal held Poland liable for expropriation of 
pharmaceutical marketing authorization in breach of the France–Poland BIT.277 
As part of Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU), the country revised 
its pharmaceutical laws to harmonize them with EU law.278 Under one of these 
harmonization measures, medicines to be sold in Poland required a renewal of 
their marketing authorization.279 In late 2008, Polish health authorities did not 
renew the authorization for two medicines produced by the claimants,280 the 
precise reasons for which remain confidential. 281  Around the same time, 
authorization was granted to Polish companies to produce market alternatives of 
these medicines. 282  Against this background, the claimants, three French 
pharmaceutical companies, commenced arbitration under the France–Poland 
BIT, contending that the denial of authorizations amounted to a substantial 
deprivation of value, and thus a direct or indirect expropriation of their 
pharmaceutical patents.283  
Poland argued that its decisions not to renew marketing authorizations 
were adopted in the “normal course of [its] duties as pharmaceutical regulator, 
and based on the drugs’ failure to comply with EU law requirements,”284 and 
thus did not amount to an expropriation. In particular, Servier could not have 
expected that authorization would indefinitely be granted in the context of both 
a heavily-regulated pharmaceutical industry and Poland’s transition to its EU 
membership.285 Moreover, Poland contended that its conduct complied with EU 
law, which was binding on both Poland and France being the “product of a joint 
French and Polish policy choice.”286 According to Poland, EU law constituted a 
“relevant rule of international law applicable between the parties” under Article 
                                         
276 For discussion of an investment treaty arbitration concerning compulsory licensing, 
see VADI, supra note 54, at 78. 
277 Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 
574–76 (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
3005.pdf. 
278 Id. ¶ 40. 
279 Id. ¶¶ 57–58. 
280 Id. ¶¶ 80, 89. 
281 Id. ¶ 48 (redacting the reason for denial). 
282 Id. ¶¶ 108–110 and 124. 
283 Id. ¶ 215. 
284 Id. ¶ 190. 
285 Id. ¶¶ 271, 274. 
286 Id. ¶ 264. 
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31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,287 and therefore it 
would be “inappropriate to find that the regulatory requirements to which both 
parties agreed could give rise to an obligation of compensation.”288 Poland 
further contended that in denying marketing authorizations to certain medicines, 
it exercised its police powers289 in a way that was proportionate to the public 
interest to promote public health and adopted in good faith,290 and hence the 
arbitrators should show deference to state regulatory choices. 291  Poland 
concluded that it had an obligation to adopt the regulatory measures because EU 
law would not have allowed other regulatory choices.292  
Servier contended that the state measures were discriminatory, 
disproportionate and unreasonable. According to Servier, the state measures 
were discriminatory because the state granted authorizations to local producers 
but rejected Servier’s applications, 293  even though no regulations required 
Poland to reject foreign applications over local. 294  Servier contended that 
“Poland viewed the harmonization process as a means to promote the local 
pharmaceutical industry, in particular through the registration of low-cost local 
generic products.”295 On proportionality, Servier suggested that, rather than 
denying authorization, the health authorities could have limited the indications 
for use of the medicines, or given conditional approval while requiring further 
information.296 Finally, the claimant alleged that no reasonable serious public 
health reason justified the nonrenewal of their syrup product 297  while 
authorizing the same product in tablet form.298  
                                         
287 Id. ¶ 265. 
288 Id. ¶ 265. 
289 Id. ¶ 276. 
290 Id. ¶ 403. 
291 Id. ¶ 280 (stressing that “in assessing the measures, [the Tribunal] should not embark 
upon an open-ended enquiry into the scientific correctness of the decisions in question or 
substitute its own regulatory choices for those made by the competent Polish regulator. 
Rather, the Tribunal should assess whether the measures were motivated by honest belief, 
held in good faith and based on reasonable scientific grounds, that is, whether Poland acted as 
a reasonable regulator.”) and ¶ 282 (arguing that “A deferential standard of review must be 
employed by the Tribunal when it comes to regulatory decisions based around science and 
national regulation.”). 
292 Id. ¶ 336. 
293 Id. ¶ 310. 
294 Id. ¶ 264 (noting that “Neither the EU Treaty, nor the EU Pharmaceuticals Directive, 
require[d] Poland to favour the local pharmaceutical industry and adopt measures to drive 
foreign competitors from the market.”). 
295 Id. ¶ 267. 
296 Id. ¶ 332. 
297 Id. ¶ 352. 
298 Id.  
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The Tribunal found that the denial of marketing authorizations amounted 
to an indirect expropriation, implicating a State’s substantial interference with 
the investor’s rights.299 The Tribunal held that such indirect expropriation was 
discriminatory and “not a matter of public necessity” 300  and awarded 
compensation to the foreign investor. As the award is extensively redacted, the 
legal test that the Tribunal adopted remains opaque; it also remains unclear 
whether the Tribunal upheld Servier’s argument that the indirect expropriation 
was unlawful.301 But the award does show that the Arbitral Tribunal has looked 
closely to the language of the applicable IIA that provided that “any 
divestment” (whether lawful or unlawful) would give rise to prompt and 
adequate compensation at the “real value” of the investment.302   
In another recent dispute, the U.S.-based pharmaceutical company Eli 
Lilly filed a Notice of Intent against the Government of Canada under NAFTA 
Chapter 11,303 claiming that the invalidation of some of its patents by Canadian 
courts for “inutility”304 amounted to unlawful expropriation305 and sought $500 
million in damages.306 Although this case is still pending, an examination of the 
parties’ arguments on the central issue of expropriation sheds light on the 
private and public considerations in the evolving dialectics.  
Eli Lilly contended that by invalidating its patent, the Canadian court 
adopted a standard of utility that was contrary to Canada’s international treaty 
obligations.307 It required not only that a given invention have some “scintilla” 
of usefulness, but also that the patent holder prove the invention has lived up to 
the usefulness “promised” by the patent holder at the time of seeking the 
patent.308 If the patented invention is found not to meet this promise, the patent 
can be invalidated. According to the claimant, this promise doctrine of utility 
diverged from patent law in other countries, and had had the effect of 
                                         
299 Id. ¶ 576. 
300 Id. ¶ 575. 
301 Id. ¶ 426 (“Servier advance[d] a theory of ‘full reparation in the event of unlawful 
expropriation,’ supported by principles of international law”). 
302 Id. ¶ 643. 
303 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Intent (7 Nov. 2012) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw1172.pdf. 
304 Id. ¶ 90.  
305 Id. ¶¶ 89–97. 
306  See Okediji, Is Intellectual Property Investment?, supra note 204, at 1121 
(highlighting that “the firm seeks to compel a change in Canadian patent law, an intervention 
by the Parliament to limit the interpretation of the utility requirement by judges.”). 
307 Id. at 94.  
308 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Intent, ¶ 37. 
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invalidating a large number of patents in recent years.309 Eli Lilly argued that 
not only would the promise doctrine unduly impede research and 
development,310 but it would also breach Canada’s obligations under several IP 
conventions311 “by imposing onerous and additional utility requirements that 
have had the effect of denying patent rights for inventions which meet the 
conditions precedent to patentability.”312 Thus, Eli Lilly argued, it constituted 
either a direct expropriation because it deprived Eli Lilly of its exclusive rights 
to prevent third parties from making, using, or selling its patented products 
during the patent term,313 or alternatively, an indirect expropriation because it 
had the effect of nullifying the value associated with the patent.314  
In its Statement of Defense, Canada countered that a direct expropriation 
only occurs when rights are taken by the state, 315  but not when a court 
invalidates a patent, because this “does not amount to a ‘taking’, but rather, 
constitutes juridical determination of the existence and scope of rights at 
law.”316 In other words, according to Canada, the company cannot claim its 
investments were expropriated because there were no investments; its “patents” 
did not even exist under Canadian law.317 Canada also argued that the protection 
against expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110 “does not apply to the 
procedurally fair invalidation of a patent by a domestic court”318 because this 
                                         
309 Id.  
310 Id. ¶ 16. 
311 Id. ¶ 6 (referring to Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, NAFTA Chapter 17 and the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty.) 
312 Id. ¶ 42. 
313 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 75 (Sep. 12, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1582.pdf. 
314 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Intent, ¶ 91 (7 Nov. 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1172.pdf. 
315 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Government of Canada Statement of Defence, ¶ 117 (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3253.pdf. 
316 Id. ¶ 108. 
317 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Counter Memorial, ¶ 302 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4131.pdf (adding that domestic law is the law that determines the existence 
and nature of property rights and stating that “If there is no valid property right at domestic 
law, then there is nothing that can be ‘taken’ within the meaning of the international law of 
expropriation. The only context in which a domestic court ruling on the validity of an 
asserted property right could amount to an expropriation is if there has been a denial of 
justice.”). 
318 Id. 
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happens each year by courts in all major jurisdictions.319 Additionally, Canada 
argued that its actions cannot give rise to expropriation under Article 1110(7) of 
NAFTA,320 because they were consistent with NAFTA Chapter Seventeen,321 
which grants the inventor exclusive rights in a new and useful invention for a 
limited period in exchange for disclosure of the invention so that society can 
benefit from this knowledge.322  
Turning to the indirect expropriation claim, Canada argued that the patent 
invalidation did not constitute a substantial deprivation of the economic value of 
the claimant’s investments.323 Rather, according to Canada, the invalidated 
patents were just one component of Eli Lilly’s overall business in Canada.324 In 
fact, the company continues to grow and sells a number of products.325 With 
regard to the character of the invalidation, Canada emphasized that “it was a 
legitimate and good faith exercise of the judicial authority of the state.”326 The 
defendant also highlighted that the “whole notion of judicial expropriation is 
entirely unsettled even in domestic legal systems, let alone in customary 
international law.”327 As the case is pending, it is not possible to foresee how it 
will be decided. 
In Apotex Inc. v. United States, Apotex, a Canadian generic 
pharmaceutical company, alleged, inter alia, expropriation of its investments as 
domestic courts refused jurisdiction to its claim seeking a declaratory judgment 
of noninfringement. 328  The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and 
subsequent amendments provide for an ANDA that enables generic 
                                         
319 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Statement of Defence, ¶ 106 (Jun. 30, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3253.pdf. 
320 Eli Lilly and Company v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Counter Memorial, ¶ 344 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4131.pdf. 
321 Id. (invalidating patents cannot give rise to expropriation claims under Chapter Eleven 
if those measures are consistent with Chapter Seventeen). 
322 Id. ¶ 7 (according to Canada, the “patent bargain” encompasses a balance between the 
patent owner and the public: “These rules are intended to ensure that patentees provide the 
consideration they promised in exchange for the grant of a 20-year monopoly. They seek to 
ensure that patents are filed on the basis of true invention, rather than of speculation. They 
verify that disclosure obligations in the patent, which is the basis for the ‘patent bargain’ with 
the public, are fulfilled. These rules are fundamental to the integrity of the patent system.”). 
323 Id. ¶¶ 409, 411. 
324 Id. ¶ 411. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. ¶ 415. 
327 Id. ¶ 414. 
328 Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 7 (Dec. 
10, 2008), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115447.pdf.  
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manufacturers to obtain regulatory approval of lower-priced generic versions of 
previously approved medicines on an expedited basis, thereby benefitting the 
U.S. healthcare system and American consumers.329 In 2003, Apotex filed an 
application with the FDA to obtain the approval of a generic version of an 
antidepressant before the expiration of the relevant patent.330 When the patent 
holder Pfizer declined to file an infringement suit, Apotex filed for a declaratory 
judgment that it was not infringing on the patent, which Apotex claimed to be a 
common legal tactic in patent litigation.331 However, the Southern District of 
New York dismissed Apotex’s suit as the claimant lacked a “reasonable 
apprehension” that Pfizer would launch a suit for patent infringement.332 The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and the petition for 
certiorari was denied.333  
Against this background, Apotex filed a notice of arbitration, contending 
that the United States’ conduct amounted to an unlawful expropriation in 
violation of NAFTA Article 1110. 334  The claimant argued that “under 
international law, expropriation occurs where government action unreasonably 
interferes with an alien’s effective use or enjoyment of property.”335 According 
to the Apotex, the U.S. interfered with its property rights in the ANDA “by 
unlawfully preventing [it] from obtaining a federal court decision” assessing the 
validity of the relevant patent, and “substantially depriving [it] of the benefits of 
its investment.”336 The claimant also argued that the defendant “ha[d] no ‘public 
purpose’ for interfering with Apotex property rights,”337 and it “failed to provide 
the company with due process of law.”338 Finally, Apotex claimed that it did not 
receive compensation for the damages it alleged to have suffered.339  
A parallel dispute,340 which was joined to the former and heard by the 
same Arbitral Tribunal, 341  involved the submission of an ANDA seeking 
                                         
329 Id. ¶ 29. 
330 Id. ¶ 14. 
331 Id. ¶ 19. 
332 Id. ¶ 20. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. ¶¶ 65–71. 
335 Id. ¶ 65. 
336 Id. ¶ 64. 
337 Id. ¶ 68. 
338 Id. ¶ 69. 
339 Id. ¶ 70. 
340 Apotex Inc. v. The Government of the United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 32 (June 4, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw1229.pdf. 
341 Although there were two different statements of claims and the US Department of 
State maintained two different web pages for the documents relating to the respective claims, 
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approval for a generic version of a heart medication.342 In order to obtain 
approval of its application, Apotex had sued the patent owner, Bristol Myers 
Squibb (BMS), to make sure that it would not face a patent infringement claim 
after it launches the Apotex medicines on the market.343 In response, BMS 
moved to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground 
that it had no intention of suing Apotex for infringement.344 The Court granted 
BMS’ motion to dismiss. 345  Apotex argued in the arbitration that the 
administrative decision of the FDA and the opinion of the courts each violate 
both U.S. statutory law346 and NAFTA.347 In particular, Apotex alleged that the 
state action interfered with its property rights in its medicine application, thus 
amounting to an unlawful expropriation in breach of NAFTA Article 1110.348 
Apotex further claimed that because the United States had no “public purpose” 
for interfering with its property rights and did not provide compensation,349 the 
company was entitled to compensatory damages. The Arbitral Tribunal 
dismissed both claims on jurisdiction because of the failure to exhaust local 
remedies,350 time limits,351 and lack of investment.352 It also ordered Apotex to 
pay the United States’ legal fees and arbitral expenses.353 Although the holding 
does not touch upon the claim of expropriation, the case shows that claims of 
judicial expropriation have been brought by pharmaceutical companies.  
In conclusion, there is no mechanical formula for determining whether 
state conduct amounts to a direct or indirect expropriation. Generally, 
                                                                                                                               
the jurisdiction/admissibility phase in each arbitration was held concurrently, albeit not 
consolidated. Therefore there was only one award dealing with the two different claims. 
Apotex Inc. v. the Government of the United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 4 (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1550.pdf. 
342 Apotex Inc. v. the Government of the United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 105 (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1550.pdf. 
343 Id. ¶ 114. 
344 Id. ¶ 115. 
345 Id. ¶ 116. 
346 Apotex Inc. v. The Government of the United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 66 (June 4, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw1229.pdf. 
347 Id. ¶ 32. 
348 Id. ¶ 76. 
349 Id. ¶¶ 78–80. 
350 Apotex Inc. v. the Government of the United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 298 (Apotex I and II) (June 14, 
2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1550.pdf. 
351 Id. ¶ 335. 
352 Id. ¶ 336. 
353 See generally id. 
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expropriation requires that there be an investment in the first place. Depending 
on the language of the applicable IIA, patent applications may not constitute 
investments. Expropriation requires that there be a substantial deprivation to the 
investor.354 The invalidation of a patent can affect the economic interests of the 
patent holder and can constitute an indirect expropriation of its rights.355 
However, the act of governing patents can constitute a form of legitimate 
regulatory activity. 356  The character and regulatory purpose behind the 
government regulation can carry weight in the assessment as to whether there 
was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power or an indirect 
expropriation.357 The burden of proving that the state conduct is inconsistent 
with a legitimate exercise of its police powers falls upon the claimant.358 
C.  Determining Compensation 
Another area where the fine-tuning of private and public interest takes 
place is the determination of compensation to be paid after an expropriation has 
taken place. IIAs’ expropriation provisions may be more beneficial to the patent 
owner than both domestic and international patent law. 359  Customary 
compensation rules, uniformly enshrined in investment protection treaties, do 
not differentiate between the various public purposes of expropriations, but 
instead pose a single standard:360 in the case of expropriation, investors must be 
                                         
354 Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 
576 (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
3005.pdf (finding that the denial of marketing authorizations amounted to an indirect 
expropriation, implicating a State’s substantial interference with the investor’s rights.) 
355 Id. (noting that “indirect expropriation, at issue in this case, implicates a State’s 
substantial interference with an investor’s rights. Such interference must be significant, even 
if not complete, in the sense of depriving the investor of its ability to benefit from the relevant 
asset”). 
356 Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 183, at 454. 
357 Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 
568 (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
3005.pdf (holding that, while it “must accord due deference to the decisions of specialized 
Polish administrators interpreting and applying laws and regulations governing their area of 
competence”, it “will also consider the manner in which those decisions were taken and their 
effect on the Claimants’ investments.”). 
358 Id. ¶ 584 (stating that “the burden then falls onto the Claimants to show that Poland’s 
regulatory actions were inconsistent with a legitimate exercise of Poland’s police powers.”). 
359 Carlos M. Correa, Bilateral Investment Agreements: Agents of New Global Standards 
for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights?, GRAIN.ORG 15 (Aug. 3, 2004), 
https://www.grain.org/fr/article/entries/125-bilateral-investment-agreements-agents-of-new-
global-standards-for-the-protection-of-intellectual-property-rights (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
360 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, Award, Case No. ARB/96/1, 
Final Award, ¶ 72 (Feb. 17, 2000) (holding that “[e]xpropriatory environmental measures—
no matter how laudable and beneficial to society as a whole—are, in this respect, similar to 
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fully compensated.361 Several investment treaties further require compensation 
to be prompt, adequate and effective, according to the so-called Hull formula.362  
In Servier v. Poland, the case concerning the alleged expropriation of 
Servier’s investments, the France–Poland BIT required that any expropriation 
would give rise to “prompt and adequate compensation” at the real value of the 
investment.363 Therefore, the Tribunal held that this compensation standard was 
to be applied, regardless of whether the expropriation was lawful or unlawful.364 
While the Tribunal had “discretion to impose additional sanctions to punish 
Treaty violations of particular seriousness,”365 it found that Poland had “not 
engaged in bad faith behaviour … that would require damages beyond the 
Treaty standard.” 366  Instead, the Tribunal awarded the real value of the 
investment plus interests, calculated “on the basis of the appropriate rate of 
interest in force at the time of divestment” as required by the France-Poland 
BIT.367  
D.  Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) has become the most often invoked 
provision in investment treaty arbitration.368 Due to its deliberate vagueness, it 
constitutes a catch-all provision covering the situations where there is no 
finding of expropriation or any other breach of other investment treaty 
standards.369 The FET standard is an absolute standard of treatment, designed to 
                                                                                                                               
any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: 
where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domestic or 
international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.”). 
361 See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 
497 (Mar. 14, 2003). 
362 The Hull formula is named after the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who 
described a full compensation standard as “prompt, adequate and effective” in a diplomatic 
exchange of notes with Mexico in 1930.  
363 Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 
37 (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3005.pdf. 
364 Id. ¶ 644. 
365 Id. ¶ 645. 
366 Id. ¶ 642. 
367 Id. ¶ 663. 
368 See Sergey Ripinsky, Russia, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 605 (Chester Brown ed., 2013) (noting that “this obligation is the one most often 
invoked by claimants in investment disputes—it is present practically in every case.”); see 
also Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT'L L. 7, 10 (2014) (pinpointing that “FET may be considered to be at the heart of 
investment arbitration.”).  
369 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 
300–01 (Sept. 28, 2007). 
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provide a basic safeguard upon which the investor can rely at any time, as 
opposed to the “relative” standards embodied in both the “national treatment” 
and “most favored nation” principles, which, in contrast, define the required 
treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to other investments.370  
In an attempt to delimit the perimeters of the standard, the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission issued an interpretation of the provision,371 which is binding 
on all NAFTA tribunals.372 The Commission clarified that the FET provision 
under NAFTA Article 1105 prescribes the customary international law’s 
minimum standard of treatment and does not require any standard of treatment 
that goes beyond that.373 Traditionally, the minimum standard of treatment 
protected investors only in instances of “egregious and shocking” conduct or 
“manifestly unfair or inequitable conduct.”374 Therefore, in the NAFTA context, 
arbitral tribunals still consider the FET standard to be the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment.375  
                                         
370 See generally CATHERINE YANNACA SMALL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A 
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 74 (2005) (highlighting that fair and equitable treatment is “an 
‘absolute’, ‘non-contingent’ standard of treatment, i.e. a standard that states the treatment to 
be accorded in terms whose exact meaning has to be determined, by reference to specific 
circumstances of application, as opposed to the “relative” standards embodied in “national 
treatment” and “most-favoured-nation” principles which define the required treatment by 
reference to the treatment accorded to other investment.”). 
371 See generally NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain 
Chapter 11 Provisions, (Jul. 31, 2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/ 
CH11understanding_e.asp. 
372 NAFTA, supra note 16, at art. 1131 (providing that “[a]n interpretation by the [FTC] 
of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this 
Section.”). 
373 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, supra note 371, at B.2 (affirming that “[t]he concepts of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond 
that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of 
aliens.”). 
374 See L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 REP. INT’L 
ARB. AWARDS, 60, 60–62 (1926). In Neer, the widow and daughter of a murdered US citizen 
sued the Mexican government for “lack of diligence” or “lack of intelligent investigation” in 
prosecuting the murderers. Id. at 61. The US-Mexico Claims Commission held that Mexico 
was not liable although it acknowledged that “better methods might have been used” for the 
investigations and the prosecution. Id. at 62. The Commission held that “the treatment of an 
alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad 
faith, to wilful [sic] neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short 
of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its 
insufficiency.”). 
375 For instance, the Glamis Gold Tribunal held that “the customary international law 
minimum standard remains as apparently articulated in the 1926 Neer award: to violate the 
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For instance, in Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States (Apotex 
III),376 which concerned the import ban on certain pharmaceuticals produced in 
Canada, the claimant contended that the U.S. breached the minimum standard of 
treatment due to a perceived lack of due process in providing the issue alert and 
the delays experienced in re-inspecting the facilities. 377  Although Apotex 
contended that the FET standard is an evolving standard which has gone beyond 
the customary minimum standard of treatment, the Tribunal sided with the 
United States and affirmed that in the NAFTA context, FET means the 
customary minimum standard of treatment.378 The Tribunal found that the 
Claimants had not presented sufficient evidence of state practice or opinio juris 
indicating an expansion of the customary minimum standard of treatment.379 
After noting that “[w]hen interpreting and applying the ‘minimum standard’, a 
Chapter 11 tribunal does not have an open-ended mandate to second-guess 
government decision making,”380 the Tribunal did not find any breach of the 
FET provision. 
In Eli Lilly v. Canada, the pending case relating to the invalidation of 
patents for failure to meet the utility requirement, the claimant contends that the 
allegedly unexpected and arbitrary adoption by the Canadian courts of a new, 
stricter approach to patent invalidation is contrary to the company’s “reasonable 
investment-backed expectations,”381 and in breach of NAFTA Article 1105.382 
                                                                                                                               
customary international law minimum standard of treatment codified in Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking – a gross denial of justice, 
manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident 
discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons – so as to fall below accepted international 
standards ....” Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 22 
(June 8 2009) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf.  
376 Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States of America (Apotex III), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award (Aug. 25, 2014). 
377 Id. ¶¶ 2.30, 2.64. 
378 Id. ¶ 9.3 (recalling the FTC Note of interpretation), ¶ 9.4 (accepting the binding effect 
of this Note of Interpretation). 
379 Id. ¶ 9.17. 
380 Id. ¶ 9.39 (quoting S.D. Myers Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, 
Partial Award, ¶ 261 (Nov. 13, 2000)). See also id. ¶ 9.37 (recalling “the need for 
international tribunals to recognise the special roles and responsibilities of regulatory bodies 
charged with protecting public health and other important public interests. These are of 
course not binding on this Tribunal, which must make its own determinations regarding the 
facts and the law relevant to this case …. Nevertheless … other decisions indicate the need 
for international tribunals to exercise caution in cases involving a state regulator’s exercise of 
discretion, particularly in sensitive areas involving protection of public health and the well-
being of patients.”). 
381 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Intent, ¶ 95 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1172.pdf.  
57 N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW [Vol. 5:1 
 
The company argues that it could not have anticipated at the time of its 
investment that the requirement for utility would be altered by the adoption of 
the “promise of the patent” doctrine into Canadian law and practice.383 In its 
Statement of Defence,384 the Government of Canada counter-argued that the 
claimant received due process before Canadian courts and simply being 
disappointed with the outcome of two patent trials does not amount to a breach 
of the relevant obligations. 385  Rather, according to the respondent, “[t]he 
threshold for a violation by a court of the minimum standard of treatment” is set 
“extremely high” under customary international law.386 Canada highlights that 
the FET standard does not prevent the evolution of a State’s legal framework,387 
as NAFTA Chapter 11 was never meant “as a kind of insurance policy against 
the risk of any changes in the host State’s legal and economic framework.”388 In 
its Counter Memorial, Canada also points out that NAFTA’s FET provision 
does not go beyond the minimum standard of treatment required under 
customary international law.389 According to Canada, “a violation of Article 
1105(1) will not be found unless there is evidence of serious malfeasance, 
manifestly arbitrary behaviour or denial of justice by the respondent NAFTA 
Party.” 390  Therefore, Canada argues that a mere frustration of investors’ 
legitimate expectations does not establish a breach of the minimum standard of 
treatment, as the theory of legitimate expectations has not become a rule of 
customary international law.391  
Although the FET standard has not presented much of a viable claim in 
the NAFTA context, it can have a concrete impact outside the NAFTA milieu, 
where arbitral tribunals have broadened the notion of fair and equitable 
treatment significantly. The standard has exceeded the customary minimum 
standard of treatment and comprises various additional requirements, such as 
transparency, due process, and others.392 Under this broader conceptualization, 
                                                                                                                               
382 Id. ¶¶ 98, 104.  
383 Id. ¶ 101. 
384 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Statement of Defence,  (Jun. 30, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3253.pdf. 
385 Id. ¶ 90. 
386 Id. ¶ 99. 
387 Id. ¶ 104. 
388 Id. 
389 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Counter Memorial, ¶ 15 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4131.pdf. 
390 Id. ¶ 227. 
391 Id. ¶ 266. 
392 Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD 
INV. & TRADE, 357, 360, 364 (2005). 
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the FET standard has figured prominently in a number of patent-related 
investment arbitrations.  
IP-related FET claims, both within and beyond the NAFTA context, have 
raised a number of questions. Does the grant of the patent by the host state 
constitute state representations which in turn create legitimate expectations the 
patent holder may rely upon?393 Can an investor rely upon international IP 
norms as a source of legitimate expectations? 394  Does investment treaty 
arbitration provide a new means to enforce international IP agreements?395 What 
is the relationship between denial of justice and indirect expropriation claims? 
The next subsections address these questions. 
1.  IP Rights as a Basis for Investor’s Legitimate Expectations 
The concept of “legitimate expectations” allows a foreign investor to 
claim compensation in situations where “the conduct of a host state creates a 
reasonable expectation … that [the investor] may rely on that conduct, such that 
a subsequent failure by the host state to honour those expectations causes the 
investor to suffer damages”.396 Legitimate expectations are not an independent 
cause of action. Whether or not the fair and equitable standard protects the 
legitimate expectations of foreign investors has been answered in various 
ways.397 The divergence concerning the content of the FET standard, and the 
                                         
393 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights in Investor-State 
Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation 13 (University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 52/2014, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463711.  
394 Id.  
395 Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 183, at 397. 
396 Chris Yost, A Case Review and Analysis of the Legitimate Expectations Principle as it 
Applies Within the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 6 (Mar. 8, 2007) (unpublished 
thesis, Australian National University), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1364996.  
397 See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/02, Award, ¶ 
372 (July 14, 2006) (holding that the fair and equitable treatment standard now protects 
legitimate investor expectations even in the absence of bad faith or egregious conduct by the 
host state); see also Vaughan Lowe, The Changing Dimensions of International Investment 
Law 98 (University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 4/2007, 2007) (arguing “there is an emerging consensus that transparency and 
legitimate expectations are matters that it is proper to consider in the context of fair and 
equitable treatment.”); cf. Michele Podestà, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty 
Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept 1–2 (Soc’y of Int’l 
Econ. Law, 3rd Biennial Global Conference, Working Paper, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2102771## (noting that “Arbitral 
tribunals … have typically taken for granted the idea that a breach of the investor’s 
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protection of the legitimate expectations of the investor, is really about the level 
of protection that should be granted to foreign investors and their investments. 
While investors want stronger investment protections, host states favor weaker 
restrictions on the exercise of their sovereign powers.398 The variance also 
expresses the preference of NAFTA states for striking a balance between public 
and private interests at the legislative (domestic) level, rather than empowering 
arbitral tribunals to find that balance between such interests at the adjudicative 
(international) level. 
Translating this general discussion in the specific context of IP 
protection, one wonders what type of expectations, if any, patents can give rise 
to. Patents are a type of IP, governed by both national statutes and international 
instruments such as the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. Can 
investors legitimately expect that these domestic and international instruments 
will not be violated by the host state? Can investors legitimately expect an 
absolute protection of their economic interests? 
Patent law is characterized by the concept of the “patent bargain” or 
granting the right of exclusive exploitation of a given invention in exchange for 
the disclosure of a novel invention.399 It expresses a fundamental and intrinsic 
balance of public and private interests. Patents do not confer absolute rights, nor 
do they create any legitimate expectation that the exclusivity they confer is 
absolute and will remain without interference from accepted checks and 
balances inherent in the IP system.400  Not only does the international IP 
framework provide for commonly used regulatory controls on the utilization 
and exploitation of patents,401 but patents are territorial in nature. Patents exist 
by virtue of legal recognition from the state. Therefore, it is within a host state’s 
competence to determine the patentability and scope of protection offered for 
patents granted pursuant to national law. Moreover, IP rights do not confer 
positive rights for rights holders to make or use the protected invention; rather 
                                                                                                                               
expectations may be relevant in deciding upon a violation of an investment treaty especially 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard.”) (internal parenthetical omitted).  
398 See Tai-Heng Cheng, Remarks as Chairman for Panel Discussion at 2007 International 
Law Weekend: Is the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard Fair and Equitable? (Oct. 27, 
2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1259939 at 5 (“[T]he 
disagreements about the content of the fair and equitable treatment standard are really about 
investors wanting stronger investment protections, and host states favoring weaker 
restrictions on the exercise of their sovereign powers.”). 
399 E.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 90–93 (2004) (describing a patent as a bargain 
between the inventor and society). 
400 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 393, at 13. 
401 Id. at 13–14 (referring to the WTO panel report in EC–Geographical Indications). 
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they are negative rights, which allow rights holders to exclude competitors from 
exploiting a given invention for a limited time. They cannot prevent states from 
regulating the use of such rights in the pursuit of legitimate public policy 
objectives.402 Conversely, if a host state grants specific assurances to an investor 
regarding the exploitation of her investment in the host state, the adoption of 
new regulatory measures affecting the economic value of her investment might 
amount to a breach of fair and equitable treatment.403 
2.  International IP Norms as a Source of Legitimate Expectations 
In several investment arbitrations, investors have claimed that measures 
adopted by the host state and affecting their investments are illegal under a 
number of international IP agreements and therefore violate the FET standard. 
According to this line of argument, if the host state is party to international 
intellectual property agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris 
Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty, an investor is justified in having 
a legitimate expectation that the state will not violate such agreements.404 This 
argument assumes that if the state has acted in a way that deviates from the 
investor’s legitimate expectations, it violates the FET. 
In Eli Lilly v. Canada, the pending case relating to the invalidation of 
patents on grounds of inutility, the claimant contends that the adoption by the 
Canadian courts of a new, stricter approach to patent invalidation is contrary to 
the company’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations,”405 and in breach of 
NAFTA Article 1105.406 The claimant contends that by violating a number of 
international law instruments governing patentability requirements, the 
Canadian measures are in breach of the FET standard.407 The company stresses 
its legitimate expectations that Canada complies with international IP treaties,408 
including the TRIPS Agreement, the Patent Cooperation Treaty and NAFTA 
Chapter 17.  
                                         
402 Panel Report, European Communities–Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications For Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, ¶ 7.210 WTO Doc. WT/DS/174R 
(Mar. 15, 2015) (holding that “the [TRIPS A]greement does not generally provide for the 
grant of positive rights to exploit or use certain subject matter, but rather provides for the 
grant of negative rights to prevent certain acts.”). 
403 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 393, at 14. 
404 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2. 
Notice of Intent, ¶¶ 95, 96 (7 Nov. 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1172.pdf. 
405 Id. ¶ 95. 
406 Id. ¶¶ 98–104.  
407 Id. ¶ 5–86. 
408 Id. ¶ 96. 
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Canada maintains that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the alleged 
breaches of Canada’s international treaty obligations409 under TRIPS, PCT or 
NAFTA Chapter Seventeen, and that enforcement of obligations under these 
other international IP agreements may only be brought before their own 
respective venues.410  
Canada also maintains that it is not breaching the investor’s legitimate 
expectations because it is complying with the substantive provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement, NAFTA Chapter 17 and the PCT. First, according to 
Canada, the TRIPS Agreement “did not attempt to create a uniform or deeply 
harmonized patent regime,” rather, it “left ample room for national variations 
and approaches to substantive patent issues.”411  In fact during the TRIPS 
negotiations, “broad terms were used due to the lack of consensus on 
substantive law and the desire to maintain flexibility.”412  Second, Canada 
stresses that NAFTA Article 1709(1), whose language was drawn upon the 
TRIPS negotiations, 413  includes the criteria “new,” “result[ing] from an 
inventive step,” and “capable of industrial application” as criteria for 
patentability of a given medicine, but also notes that “a Party may deem the 
terms ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ to be synonymous 
with the terms ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful,’ respectively.”414 This indicates that 
the parties could not agree on a common terminology for patentability 
requirements and their substantive content. Third, Canada notes the irrelevance 
of the PCT to the case. In fact, according to the state, such treaty “does not 
govern either substantive conditions of patentability or the invalidation of 
patents. It simply facilitates the international filing of patent applications ….”415 
In fact, Canada stresses that “[f]iling in accordance with the PCT is no 
                                         
409 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Government of Canada Statement of Defence, ¶ 83 (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3253.pdf (pinpointing that 
“[t]he Tribunal’s jurisdiction in this matter relates only to alleged breaches of NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven obligations.”). 
410 Id. ¶ 84 (noting that “[d]isputes in respect of an alleged breach of TRIPS obligations 
may only be brought pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade 
Organisation. Allegations of a breach of the PCT are, in accordance with that Treaty, to be 
brought before the International Court of Justice. Allegations of a breach of NAFTA Chapter 
Seventeen are to be brought on a State-to-State basis before a tribunal constituted pursuant to 
NAFTA Chapter Twenty.”). 
411 Id. ¶ 91. 
412 Id. ¶ 87. 
413 Id.  
414 Id. 
415 Id. ¶ 94. 
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guarantee that a patent application will result in a successful patent grant, or that 
any grant of a patent will withstand judicial scrutiny.”416 
The argument that a state’s adhesion to other treaties gives rise to 
legitimate expectations that the state will not breach such treaties relies on an 
expansive and evolving interpretation of the FET standard. Under NAFTA, it 
seems that such a claim lacks merits, as NAFTA tribunals have adopted a 
restrictive approach to the interpretation of the standard, analogizing it to the 
minimum standard of treatment under customary law. Beyond the NAFTA 
context, some tribunals have considered that the protection of legitimate 
expectations constitutes part of the FET standard. However, it remains to be 
seen whether arbitral tribunals will consider that legitimate expectations include 
an expectation that the host state will not breach its international law 
commitments. The argument, if adopted, would impose a powerful constraint on 
states for which the state did not bargain for in the negotiation of IIAs. 
Even if arbitral tribunals accepted such an expansive interpretation of the 
FET standard, the fact remains that international IP treaties provide very vague 
terms, and therefore have traditionally left much room for maneuver to the 
states. In general terms, international IP treaties “include deliberate gaps, 
reflecting areas of non-convergence and the residual sovereignty of states to 
legislate specific rules.”417 Such treaties do not define the concepts of utility, 
novelty and nonobviousness because “there is no consensus on how to apply 
these doctrines.”418 Rather the content of these “open-ended” standards evolves 
over time,419 and states shape patentability standards “to achieve net policy 
goals in specific sectors.”420  
The national implementation of international IP standards varies across 
countries.421 As the current international IP regime is “rooted in the disparate 
practices … of different nations,” “non-uniformity pervades [its] very fabric.”422 
For instance, the TRIPS Agreement clarifies that “[m]embers shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this 
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”423 Moreover, the Rules 
                                         
416 Id. 
417 Okediji, Is Intellectual Property Investment?, supra note 204, at 1132. 
418 Jerome Reichman, Panelist Presentation, Investment Chapters in Trade Agreements: 
IP Rights as Protected Investments (Apr. 11, 2014).  
419 Id. 
420 Okediji, Is Intellectual Property Investment?, supra note 204, at 1134. 
421 Id. at 1132.  
422 Alan M. Anderson et al., The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights: TRIPS, 
BITs, and the Search for Uniform Protection, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 265, 289 (2010). 
423 TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1. 
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and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides that 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body (AB) “cannot add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations provided for in the covered agreements.”424 WTO jurisprudence 
has confirmed this “space reserved for state sovereignty.”425 In conclusion, how 
countries achieve a competitive balance between public and private interests 
remains a national prerogative, provided that they comply with their 
international obligations. 
3.  A New Tool to Enforce International Intellectual Property Agreements 
Can investment treaty arbitration constitute a new tool to enforce 
international IP agreements? Can it provide investors with an alternative venue 
to challenge the consistency of domestic regulations with the TRIPS 
Agreement, instead of lobbying their governments to bring a WTO dispute? 
And if parallel proceedings are brought before the WTO DSM and investment 
treaty arbitral tribunals respectively, will arbitral tribunals, WTO panels and the 
AB show any deference to the other venues?  
In some exceptional cases, foreign investors have attempted to use 
international investment law to indirectly protect other values by requiring a 
state to respect its international law obligations that are critical to the success of 
the investment.426 For instance, a Canadian investor filed an investment treaty 
claim against Barbados, arguing that the alleged failure to enforce its own 
environmental law implementing international obligations violates FET under 
the Canada-Barbados BIT.427 The formulation of this claim illustrates a novel 
form of interplay between international investment law and other branches of 
international law. 
When adjudicating IP investment disputes, the question arises as to 
whether arbitral tribunals can take into account other bodies of law in addition 
to international investment law. A breach of the TRIPS Agreement cannot 
provide a basis for an independent claim in investment treaty arbitration. 
Investment treaty arbitral tribunals cannot adjudicate on a violation of 
                                         
424 DSU art. 19.2. 
425   Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶¶ 47–48, WTO Doc. WT/DS/50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
426 VALENTINA VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 129–31 (2014). 
427 Peter A. Allard v. Barbados, UNCITRAL, Notice of Dispute, ¶ 16 (Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://graemehall.com/legal/papers/BIT-Complaint.pdf (asserting as the investor acquired 
wetlands and subsequently developed them into an ecotourism facility, he claimed that 
Barbados had failed to prevent the discharge of raw sewage into the wetlands and to 
investigate or prosecute polluters, thus reducing the profitability of its investment). 
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international IP law, unless the relevant investment treaty requires them to do 
so.  
If an international investment agreement does not refer to other treaty 
obligations, it appears difficult to assume that the IIA parties wished to interpret 
the FET standard in such a wide-ranging manner.428 In fact, had the IIA parties 
wished to expand the scope of protection to cover violations of other treaties, 
they could have included explicit reference to these other treaties. In addition, 
the DSM has exclusive jurisdiction in settling disputes over breaches of WTO 
law.429 This seems to preclude arbitral tribunals to adopt such an expansive 
interpretation of the FET standard.  
For instance, in Grand River Enterprises Six Nations v. United States, the 
Tribunal held that the FET standard in NAFTA Chapter 11 “does not 
incorporate other legal protections that may be provided investors or classes of 
investors under other sources of [international] law” otherwise the standard 
would become “a vehicle for generally litigating claims based on alleged 
infractions of domestic and international law.”430 In another case, the Tribunal 
held that the applicable law “does not incorporate the universe of international 
law into the BITs or into disputes arising under the BITs.”431  
Yet, when interpreting a treaty, a tribunal can take account of other 
international obligations of the parties according to customary rules of treaty 
interpretation as restated by the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).432 Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT provides that there shall be taken into 
account, together with the context, “[a]ny relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.” Therefore, the host state’s 
obligation under other international IP treaties can come into consideration of 
the disputes before arbitral tribunals. The TRIPS Agreement, for example, can 
thus provide “interpretive background” to inform investment treaty standards.433  
Arbitral tribunals risk overlooking important aspects of IP policy and 
being detached from local communities and their concerns. This is all the more 
likely considering the fact that their appointment usually requires expertise in 
                                         
428 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 393, at 295. 
429 DSU art. 23. 
430 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 219 (Jan. 12, 
2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156820.pdf. 
431 Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic of Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15) and 
Border Timbers Ltd. v. Republic of Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25), Procedural 
Ord. No. 2, ¶ 57 (June 26, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita1044.pdf. 
432 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
433 Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 183, at 402. 
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international investment law, not IP law. They contribute to an investment law 
culture with its own language and way of speaking, expressing ideas, as well as 
defining problems and solutions.434 Furthermore, due to the emergence of a 
jurisprudence constante in international investment law, there is a risk that 
arbitral tribunals will conform to these de facto precedents without necessarily 
considering analogous IP cases adjudicated before other international courts and 
tribunals. Although consistency in decision-making is desirable because it can 
enhance the coherence and predictability of the awards and contribute to the 
legitimacy of arbitral tribunals as a legal institution, arbitrators should be 
cautious of precedents that place strong emphases on the investors’ economic 
interests at the detriment of the public interest pursued by the host state.  
Have arbitral tribunals paid any attention to the specificities of IP? Are 
they imposing standards of good IP governance, by adopting general 
administrative law principles, such as proportionality, due process, and 
reasonableness? These questions present a fertile field of inquiry, which may 
help in detecting common patterns and lead to a balance between the protection 
of investors’ economic interests and public welfare. While international 
investment law should not be used to enforce other IP treaties, arbitral tribunals 
still have to consider these other treaties in the arbitrations.435 
4.  Denial of Justice Claims  
One particular form of FET violations,436 denial of justice, is one of the 
oldest principles of customary international law,437 and “lies at the heart of the 
                                         
434 For an analogous argument with regard to the WTO law, see Fiona Smith, Power, 
Rules and the WTO, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1063, 1082 (2013) (“[I]n this ‘world’ … ideas from 
outsiders, like human rights and environmental scholars, about how WTO law should be 
regulated are often rejected as ‘wrong’ or misguided by trade lawyers and policymakers. 
These ideas often place the individual at the heart of the analysis and address her diverse and 
complex needs in ways that simply do not translate readily into the language of comparative 
advantage and trade liberalization. We should not really be surprised therefore when trade 
experts dismiss them as wrong or misguided, or when such ideas are castigated as 
‘protectionist’ . . . .”). 
435 For an analogous argument concerning trade law and human rights, see Christopher 
McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework 
for Discussion of the Legality of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 47 (1999). 
436 IIAs require fair and equitable treatment consistent with customary international law, 
including “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory 
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal 
systems of the world.” See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, art. 6(5), Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. No. 110–
23. Therefore, the FET standard is considered to include denial of justice claims. See 
UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, at xvi-xvii (2012). 
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development of international law on the treatment of aliens and of foreign 
investment.”438 Denial of justice imposes liability on the state for serious 
failures of its system of justice.439 Since denial of justice involves a system 
failure, exhaustion of local remedies is a prerequisite for claiming it.440 While 
denials of justice claims were traditionally discussed in inter-state disputes, 
nowadays, foreign investors can challenge denial of justice directly before 
arbitral tribunals. 441  
A successful invocation of denial of justice is mutually exclusive with a 
finding of a judicial expropriation,442 but investors often make both claims as a 
matter of strategy. This parallel invocation of the denial of justice claim and the 
indirect expropriation claim enables the foreign investor to fully exploit the 
                                                                                                                               
437 Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment 
Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 729, 730–31 (2009) (“[T]he principle of the ‘minimum standard of 
justice’ to be reserved to aliens and their economic interests under customary international 
law . . . presupposes that the individual who has suffered an injury in a foreign country at the 
hands of public authorities or of private entities must be afforded the opportunity to obtain 
redress before a court of law or appropriate administrative agency. Only when ‘justice’ is not 
delivered, either because judicial remedies are not available or the administration of justice is 
so inadequate, deficient, or deceptively manipulated as to deprive the injured alien of 
effective remedial process, can the alien invoke ‘denial of justice’: a wrongful act for which 
international responsibility may arise.”). 
438 Id. at 729. 
439 JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 36 (2005) (“[A] state 
incurs responsibility if it administers justice to aliens in a fundamentally unfair manner” and 
“[I]nternational responsibility arises as a result of the failure of a national legal system to 
provide due process.”).  
440 Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 154 (June 26, 
2003), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0470.pdf (“No instance 
has been drawn to our attention in which an international tribunal has held a State responsible 
for a breach of international law constituted by a lower court decision when there was 
available an effective and adequate appeal within the State’s legal system.”). 
441 Roger P. Alford, Ancillary Discovery to Prove Denial of Justice, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 
127, 131–132 (2012) (“Until recent decades, the denial of justice was frequently a wrong 
without a remedy . . .” that “the diplomatic espousal of claims pursuant to a friendship, 
commerce, and navigation treaty (FCN) or similar treaties — w[as a] cumbersome and rare 
event[] . . .” but that the rise of BITs has “altered this course of events . . . .”).  
442 See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/7, Award (June, 30 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0734.pdf (finding the host state responsible for expropriation resulting from the 
judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings instituted by an investor in pursuit of its 
contractual right.). 
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scope of the protection afforded under IIAs.443 This section examines how these 
claims have been articulated.  
Denial of justice is very difficult to prove. Rarely has such a claim been 
successful. It is not a denial of justice if state courts made a mere error of law. 
Investment treaty tribunals are not an appeal mechanism for the decisions of 
domestic courts. Rather, denial of justice implies the failure of a national legal 
system as a whole to satisfy minimum standards of treatment. Moreover, to 
invoke denial of justice successfully, the claimant must exhaust local remedies 
first, giving the judicial system of the host state a chance to redress its failure 
before filing a claim before an international arbitral tribunal.444  
For instance, in Apotex v. United States (Apotex I and II), concerning the 
approval for generic versions of given antidepressant and anti-cholesterol 
medicines, the claimant made parallel claims that the courts’ judgments were 
“unjust” and amounted to an expropriation of its investment, and that they 
constituted a “substantive ‘denial of justice’” in violation of NAFTA Article 
1105.445 In particular, the claimant contended that it was denied justice when 
U.S. courts allegedly “rendered manifestly unjust decisions” by misapplying 
domestic law.446  
Both parties agreed that, in order to eventually establish a denial of 
justice, “judicial finality must first be reached in the host State’s domestic 
courts … unless such recourse is ‘obviously futile’.”447 However, they disagreed 
on the meaning of “obviously futile.”448 The United States pointed out that with 
respect to one of its medicines, Apotex had not pursued all available avenues 
before the domestic courts. In particular, it had not sought U.S. Supreme Court 
review of the lower court decisions.449 Apotex submitted that “it [wa]s wholly 
unrealistic to suppose that the Supreme Court would not only have granted the 
petition, but could have scheduled argument and render an opinion in Apotex’s 
                                         
443  See generally Mavluda Sattorova, Denial of Justice Disguised?: Investment 
Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investors from Judicial Misconduct, 61 INT’L 
COMP. L. Q. 223–46 (2012); Mavluda Sattorova, Judicial Expropriation or Denial of 
Justice?: A Note on Saipem v Bangladesh, 13 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 35 (2010). On denial of 
justice, see generally PAULSSON, supra note 439. 
444 PAULSSON, supra note 439, at 130. 
445 Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 61–62 
(Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115447.pdf. 
446 Id. ¶ 63. 
447 Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶ 257 (June 14, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1550.pdf (footnote omitted). 
448 Id. 
449 Id. ¶ 250. 
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favour … Any efforts to achieve such a result would have been “objectively 
futile.”450 
The Arbitral Tribunal upheld all preliminary objections raised by the 
United States, including dismissing the denial of justice claim, on the grounds 
that the claimant had failed to exhaust local remedies.451 The Tribunal reasoned 
that the judicial acts of the lower courts lacked sufficient finality to form the 
basis of claims under NAFTA Chapter 11.452 While the Tribunal appreciated 
that “petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court was unlikely to secure the desired 
relief,”453 it held that “under established principles, the question whether the 
failure to obtain judicial finality may be excused for ‘obvious futility’ turns on 
the unavailability of relief by a higher judicial authority, not on measuring the 
likelihood that the higher judicial authority would have granted the desired 
relief.”454 The Tribunal explained that the national court system must be given a 
chance to correct errors before its perceived failings can constitute an 
international wrong.455 
By contrast, claims of judicial expropriation have not required exhaustion 
of local remedies.456 For instance, the Saipem Tribunal found the host state 
responsible for expropriation resulting from the judicial intervention in arbitral 
proceedings dismissing the respondent’s objection that the exhaustion of local 
remedies was a substantive condition for judicial expropriation. Rather, the 
Tribunal clarified that the local remedies rule would apply in the case of denial 
of justice, but not in the case involving judicial expropriation. Therefore, the 
claim of judicial expropriation can be easier to substantiate and can be more 
investor-friendly in terms of eventual compensation. As a result, denial of 
justice claims seem to favour the state autonomy over the protection of private 
economic interests. Conversely, judicial expropriation claims may be more 
favorable to investors than denial of justice claims and can affect the state 
judiciary autonomy in the pharmaceutical sector.  
                                         
450 Id. ¶ 274. 
451 Id. ¶ 135.  
452 Id. ¶ 267. 
453 Id. ¶ 276. 
454 Id. 
455 Id. ¶¶ 281–282. 
456 See generally Sattorova, Judicial Expropriation or Denial of Justice?: A Note on 
Saipem v Bangladesh, supra note 443; Sattorova, Denial of Justice Disguised?: Investment 
Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investors from Judicial Misconduct, supra note 
443. 
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E.  Non-Discrimination 
The non-discrimination principle is a cornerstone of international 
investment law.457 It is typically reflected in two investment treaty provisions:458 
the principles of national treatment (NT)459 and most-favored-nation (MFN) 
treatment. 460  The basic purpose of the NT and MFN clauses is to avoid 
discrimination and to guarantee equal competitive opportunities for foreign 
investors in the host state. These two standards do not guarantee a specific level 
of protection but are relative standards that require a host country to treat a 
foreign investor in the same way that a domestic investor or an investor from 
another country in like circumstances would be treated. In order to ascertain 
whether companies are in “like circumstances,”461 one should first consider 
whether they are in the same sector and whether those competitors have been 
accorded more favorable treatment than the claimant. Then, in order to ascertain 
whether there is improper discrimination or a legitimate distinction, one should 
consider the impact and objective of a given state measure in the particular 
field.462  
Certain apparently neutral regulations may substantively discriminate 
against foreign companies and their investments.463 In Eli Lilly v. Canada, the 
pending case relating to the invalidation of patents, the claimant alleges that 
Canada denied the company national treatment.464 First, the company contends 
that it faces more arduous patent standards in Canada than a Canadian investor 
might face in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and Europe.465 Yet, 
                                         
457 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 393, at 31. 
458 The principle of non-discrimination also constitutes one of the prongs for establishing 
the lawfulness of expropriation and the unfairness of a given state’s conduct. See supra 
Sections IV. B. , IV. D. respectively. 
459 See, e.g., US Model BIT (“1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, 
and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 2. Each Party shall accord to 
covered investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to 
investments in its territory of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.”). 
460 Id. 
461 Id. 
462 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 393, at 34. 
463 See Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Final Award 
(Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
3005.pdf. 
464 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Intent, ¶¶ 105–07 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1172.pdf. 
465 Id. ¶ 106. 
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this form of extraterritorial analogy is highly unusual in national treatment 
claims before arbitral tribunals, given the regulatory diversity of IP laws across 
the globe, and is likely not going to be accepted by the Arbitral Tribunal.466 
Second, the company argues that domestic generic pharmaceutical companies 
received more favourable treatment as they have benefited from the invalidation 
of Eli Lilly’s patent.467 Third, the claimant highlights that only pharmaceutical 
companies bear the burden of the promise doctrine, rather than patent holders in 
other economic sectors.468 According to the claimants, the judicial decisions 
amount to a de facto discrimination against pharmaceutical patents, contrary to 
the state’s obligation not to discriminate among different fields of technology 
under NAFTA Article 1709(7).469 While the case is still pending, it can have a 
significant impact on access to medicines. In fact, if the Arbitral Tribunal 
upholds the investor’s claim, it would be more difficult for generic 
pharmaceutical companies to enter into the relevant market.  
In Apotex v. United States (Apotex I and II),470 concerning the approval 
for generic versions of antidepressant and anti-cholesterol medicines,471 the 
claimant contended inter alia that the host state violated the non-discrimination 
provision by “failing to treat Apotex in the same fashion as U.S. investors.”472 
As the case was dismissed on jurisdiction, the discrimination claim became 
moot.473  
There is a fine line between discrimination and legitimate distinctions 
based on public policy reasons. This line is difficult to identify, because 
                                         
466 Luke Eric Peterson, Newly Discovered Document Shows that Pharma Corp Hopes to 
Construe Alleged Non-Compliance with Patent Treaties as a Breach of Investment Treaty, 5 
INV. ARB. REP. 15, 17 (Dec. 10, 2012) (“This unusual form of extra-territorial comparison is 
not commonly seen in National Treatment claims under investment treaties.”). 
467 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
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468 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, 
Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 12 (Sept. 12, 2003). 
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470 Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States of America (Apotex III), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 257 (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115447.pdf. 
471 Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States of America (Apotex III), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 58–60 (Dec. 10, 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1323.pdf. 
472 Id. ¶ 60(f). 
473 Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States of America (Apotex III), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 358(a)–(c) (June 14, 
2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115447.pdf. 
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“‘discrimination’ and ‘non-discrimination’ are not polar opposites in a static 
system.” 474  In Apotex III, which concerned an import ban on certain 
pharmaceuticals produced in Canada, Apotex contended that it had been 
discriminated against as comparable national and foreign manufacturers had 
received better treatment. Under the NT claim, Apotex argued that it had been 
treated less favourably than other comparable domestic investors.475 The U.S. 
countered that manufacturers in the U.S. are subject to even more regular 
inspections and enforcement due to their location.476 The Tribunal held that 
there was no violation of NT as the claimant and the domestic competitors were 
not in “like circumstances.”477 Under the MFN claim, Apotex contended the 
FDA inspected a competitor’s facilities in Israel and found many violations,478 
but did not issue an import alert against the Israeli manufacturer.479 Although the 
Tribunal held that the U.S. had treated Apotex less favourably than the Israeli 
manufacturer,480 and thus had de facto discriminated against Apotex, it still 
concluded that there was no discrimination because the U.S. had established 
legitimate reasons for the different treatment.481 The United States submitted 
that “the FDA is required necessarily to exercise a difficult regulatory discretion 
lying at the heart of its important mandate on public health; and that this 
discretion as to enforcement actions is never a binary choice, but depends on 
many factors particular to the specific situation.”482 The Tribunal concluded that, 
in casu, the FDA actions were “materially influenced by the FDA’s genuine 
concerns over shortages of essential drugs manufactured” by the Israeli 
manufacturer, 483  and had established a legitimate reason for the different 
treatment.484   
Not only can discrimination claims substantiate breaches of NT and MFN 
treatment, they can also evidence the unlawfulness of a given expropriation or 
the unfairness of a given state conduct. While in some arbitrations, arbitral 
                                         
474  Konrad von Moltke, Discrimination and Non-Discrimination in Foreign Direct 
Investment: Mining Issues, Conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment, 
at 7 (Feb. 8, 2002), http://www.oecd.org/env/1819921.pdf. 
475 Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)12/1, Award, 
(Apotex III), ¶ 2.31 (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3324.pdf. 
476 Id. ¶¶ 8.31, 8.48. 
477 Id. ¶ 8.57.  
478 Id. ¶ 3.120. 
479 Id. ¶ 3.153. 
480 Id. ¶ 8.62. 
481 Id. ¶ 8.65. 
482 Id. ¶ 8.69. 
483 Id. ¶¶ 8.71, 8.73. 
484 Id. ¶ 8.78. 
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tribunals can uphold such claims as a distinct violation of the MFN or NT 
provisions in the relevant BIT,485 in other cases discrimination can constitute 
evidence of the breach of the FET standard,486 or be one of the relevant factors 
of unlawful expropriation.487 For instance, in Servier v. Poland, Servier asserted 
that “under customary international law, the expropriation of an investment can 
only take place for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, and 
against compensation.” 488  After holding that “notions of unfairness and 
discrimination may insert themselves into a discussion of what constitutes 
divestment of property,”489 the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that “[n]ot only was 
the refusal of authorisation discriminatory, but the regulatory measures were 
disproportionate in nature and … not a matter of public necessity,”490 thus 
amounting to an indirect expropriation.491  
Discrimination claims play an important role in investment treaty 
arbitration. A first issue that arbitral tribunals must ascertain is the existence of 
like circumstances. In the absence of like circumstances, differential treatment 
does not constitute discrimination but a legitimate distinction between different 
                                         
485 See, e.g., id. ¶ 8.65. 
486 Kenneth Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. 
INT’L L. & POL. 43, 53 (2010) (“The fair and equitable treatment standard in BITs has been 
interpreted as requiring that covered investment or investors receive treatment that is 
reasonable, consistent, non-discriminatory, transparent, and in accordance with due 
process.”). See also Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, 
Final Award, ¶ 410 (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw3005.pdf, (“Servier’s position is that Poland has breached its obligation to 
provide fair and equitable treatment to Servier’s investments and has treated Servier’s 
investments in an unjustified and discriminatory manner.” (footnote omitted)). 
487  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2012, Expropriation: 
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 3, 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 (reviewing “the conditions for an expropriation to be lawful, 
namely public purpose, non-discrimination, due process and payment of compensation.”). 
488 See Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award, ¶ 217 (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw3005.pdf. 
489 Id. ¶ 524. 
490 Id. ¶ 575. 
491 Id. ¶ 570 (“[T]he Respondent’s denial of marketing authorisations would divest the 
Claimants of their property, giving rise to a requirement of compensation under the BIT, if 
Poland exercised its administrative and regulatory powers in bad faith, for some non-public 
purpose, or in a fashion that was either discriminatory or lacking in proportionality between 
the public purpose and the actions taken.”). 
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issues.492 Certain distinctions may be legitimate and thus do not constitute 
discrimination in breach of the relevant investment treaty standards.493  
In conclusion, non-discrimination is a key element for striking an 
appropriate balance between the public and private interests.494 It helps to ensure 
that the private interests are not unduly constrained for unspecified illegitimate 
reasons. A measure allegedly pursuing a public purpose but in fact serving other 
private domestic interests can constitute a disguised discrimination in breach of 
relevant investment treaty standards. By reviewing state measures and checking 
that they are not discriminatory, arbitral tribunals can foster an appropriate 
balance between genuinely public and private interests. 
V 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT  
States have an inherent right to regulate,495 particularly with regard to 
pharmaceuticals, because the regulation of medicines is crucial to public 
health.496 Public health is central to the very existence of the state, and the duty 
to protect it arises from both domestic law and the social contract that underlies 
most governments.497 Moreover, from a practical standpoint, national authorities 
are better placed to appreciate local societies’ needs.498 Therefore, international 
conventions protecting various aspects of IP acknowledge the state’s right and 
duty to protect public health.499  
                                         
492 Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 8.57 (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/233043.pdf (stressing that domestic 
pharmaceutical companies and foreign companies were not in like circumstances). 
493 Id. ¶ 8.78. 
494  Konrad von Moltke, Discrimination and Non-Discrimination in Foreign Direct 
Investment: Mining Issues, Conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment, 
at 6 (Feb. 8, 2002), http://www.oecd.org/env/1819921.pdf (“[N]on-discrimination in relation 
to foreign direct investment means that the interests of a foreign investor and the public 
interest in an investment will be weighed in a manner that is legitimate, transparent, and 
accountable, and in accordance with same rules, criteria and procedures that apply to 
domestic [and other foreign] investors.”). 
495 Chang-fa Lo, External Regime Coherence: WTO/BIT and Public Health Tension as an 
Illustration, 7 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 263, 276 (2012) (noting that “the 
host country has an inherent…‘right to regulate’”). 
496 See, e.g., the summary of the Respondent’s case in Apotex III, ¶ 2.38 (contending that 
“for more than a century, the Respondent has established laws and regulations to prevent the 
importation of adulterated drugs in order to protect public health in the USA. The FDA’s 
policy on import alerts has been in effect since at least the 1970s. The Respondent did not 
relinquish this authority and responsibility when it concluded NAFTA.”). 
497 VADI, supra note 54, at 30. 
498 Id. 
499 See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 8.  
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Regulations governing patent rights are based on a delicate equilibrium 
between public and private interests.500 States balance public and private interest 
in such areas depending on their developmental and public health needs. In fact, 
the protection of public health necessarily requires constraining a wide range of 
private activities. 501  For example, states can constrain the rights of 
pharmaceutical companies so as to prevent nuisance and protect public health.502  
Patent owners have increasingly used investor-state arbitration to 
challenge regulatory measures adopted by the host states, and these arbitrations 
have significant impact on the state regulatory autonomy. Arbitral tribunals 
assess the state’s compliance with investment treaty provisions. This scrutiny 
may promote good pharmaceutical governance, incentivizing states to pursue 
the regulation of public health objectives in a transparent, reasonable and non-
discriminatory manner, while preserving a state’s legitimate interest to regulate 
for its domestic public policy. 
Given the recent rise in the incidence of arbitrations,503 it is of utmost 
importance to reflect on this emerging jurisprudence and its possible impact on 
the public health policies of host states. Pharmaceutical patent investment 
arbitrations constitute a paradigmatic case study of the interplay between the 
public and private interests in international investment law and arbitration.504 
They show that private actors are increasingly playing a prominent role in 
transnational governance of IP, and there are ongoing attempts of shifting 
enforcement of IP rights from interstate fora to international investment 
arbitration. Investment arbitration constitutes an avenue for the dialectical 
                                         
500 See Apotex Holdings Inc, Apotex Inc. v. United States of America (Apotex III), ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 210 (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115447.pdf; Apotex Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 7.44 (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/233043.pdf (with regard to grant of patents and the ANDAs); Eli Lilly and 
Company v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to 
Submit a Claim to Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, ¶ 35 (Nov. 7, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1172.pdf (with regard to the 
revocation of patents). 
501 VADI, supra note 54, at 31. 
502 Id. (noting that “[w]hile the industry often asserts that economic principles militate 
against state interference, public health law has historically constrained the rights of 
individuals and businesses so as to prevent nuisance.”). 
503 See supra Part IV. 
504 Other studies have examined the clash between private and public interests in 
investment law and arbitration. See Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in International 
Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367 (2013–2014); Alex 
Mills, Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International Investment Law 
and Arbitration, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469 (2011).  
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interaction between the economic interests of the patent holders and the state 
interest in public health protection.  
VI 
LEGISLATIVE AND INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES TO THE EMERGING 
DIALECTICS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS IN IP-RELATED 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
In the emerging dialectics between patent protection and public health in 
international investment law and arbitration, treaty making and interpretation 
can play a crucial role to address the tension between, and eventually reconcile, 
public and private interests. This section proposes some legislative and 
interpretive approaches to better accommodate the dialectics between private 
and public interests in international investment law and arbitration.  
At the legislative level, treaty negotiators can introduce some carve-outs, 
clarifications and flexibilities in the text of investment treaties. Negotiators 
could consider carving out litigation on pharmaceutical patents from the 
jurisdiction of investment arbitral tribunals. Some international investment 
agreements expressly clarify that the exercise of state regulatory autonomy in 
the pharmaceutical sector does not per se amount to a breach of investment 
treaty provisions,505 and that compliance with the TRIPS Agreement provisions 
may preclude any expropriation claim.506 For instance, Article 6(5) of the U.S. 
Model BIT of 2012 states that “This Article does not apply to … the revocation, 
limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such 
issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement.”507  
Yet, the creation, limitation, and revocation of IP rights are regulated only 
in very broad brushes by the TRIPS Agreement. For instance, the TRIPS 
Agreement only requires that patents should be granted for new, inventive and 
useful inventions,508 but it does not define these terms.509 The question of what 
                                         
505 See, e.g., US Model BIT art. 6(5) (“This Article does not apply to the issuance of 
compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the 
TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, 
to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement.”).  
506 Mercurio, supra note 228, at 905. 
507 US Model BIT art. 6(5). 
508 TRIPS Agreement art. 27(1) (“Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents 
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application.”). 
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deserves to be patented is left for countries to determine in light of their own 
needs. Countries can exclude some fields, such as plants, animals and surgical 
methods, from patentability to protect public order.510 The TRIPS Agreement 
also allows for member states to provide for limited exceptions and other uses 
of the patent without the patent owner’s consent, leaving states with the 
flexibility to implement regulatory measures for the purpose of domestic 
policy.511 With regard to revocation, the TRIPS Agreement does not address the 
grounds for forfeiture; it only requires member states to provide judicial review 
for every decision to revoke a patent.512  
Therefore, not only can arbitrations pioneer the interpretation and 
application of relevant IP provisions and pave the way to subsequent arbitral 
awards, but they can also serve as indirect enforcement tools of WTO law and 
influence the development of the same. WTO law has its own enforcement 
tools. The WTO DSM has been defined as the “jewel in the crown” of this 
organization,513 and it has exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes under the 
covered agreements.514 However, only a limited number of IP disputes have 
been brought before the WTO, 515  and TRIPS consistency is tested in 
proceedings outside the DSM.516 There is a certain “convergence” between 
                                                                                                                               
509 For instance, deciding whether a new formulation (producing a pill version of a 
medicine that formerly came as a powder) or a new combination (combining two or more 
existing molecules into a new pill) or a new use of a medicine deserves a new twenty-year 
patent is a prerogative of states and is not determined by the TRIPS Agreement. 
510 TRIPS Agreement art. 27(2) (“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or 
to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made 
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.”). 
511 Id. at art. 30 (“Exceptions to Rights Conferred”) and art. 31 (“Other Use Without 
Authorization of the Right Holder”). 
512 Id. at art. 32 (providing that “[a]n opportunity for judicial review of any decision to 
revoke or forfeit a patent shall be available.”). 
513  AMRITA NARLIKAR, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 85 (2005). 
514 DSU art. 23 (providing that “When Members seek the redress of a violation of 
obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or 
an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have 
recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”). 
515 Id. at 20. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog That Barked But Didn’t Bite: Fifteen 
Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 389 
(2010). 
516  Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 393, at 19, 36 (highlighting the risk that “the 
interpretative result may well be different from the result achieved in a ‘pure’ WTO 
setting.”). 
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international investment law and international trade law,517 and the interpretation 
of the TRIPS Agreement by arbitral tribunals is one of the areas of contact 
between the two areas of international law.518 
In interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, arbitrators should be aware of the 
balance between private and public interests intrinsic to the regulation of 
pharmaceutical patents. The TRIPS Agreement expressly presents clauses 
taking public health under consideration in construing IP rights. Article 7 of the 
TRIPS Agreement provides that  
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and 
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.”519  
In parallel, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “Members may, 
in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement.”520 When interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, arbitrators must 
take into account Articles 7 and 8, which set forth fundamental principles of IP 
governance,521 and provide space for reconciliation between private and public 
interests in IP regulation.  
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health522 has 
further reinforced state regulatory space to adopt public health measures,523 
recognizing the WTO members’ right to protect public health524 and to use the 
                                         
517 Id.  
518  See VALENTINA VADI, ANALOGIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 148 (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) (pinpointing that although there is 
no binding precedent in international law, both WTO panels and arbitral tribunals are not 
bound to follow “precedents” of other jurisdictions, they refer to each other’s jurisprudence.). 
519 TRIPS Agreement art. 7. 
520 TRIPS Agreement art. 8(1). 
521 Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement are entitled “Objectives” and “Principles”, 
respectively. 
522 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
523 See Frederick Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469 (2002). 
524 Doha Declaration ¶ 4 (“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while 
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flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement.525 Where clear reference is 
made to the TRIPS Agreement, international investment agreements incorporate 
the TRIPS Agreement, including its objectives and principles as stated in 
Articles 7 and 8, as well as the relevant interpretative background provided by 
the Doha Declaration.526 Such provisions then become applicable and may 
provide guidance in the context of investment disputes. 
Arbitrators must be mindful of the need of preserving a suitable balance 
between the public and private interests intrinsic in patent protection even in 
those cases in which the investment chapters of FTAs refer to its own IP 
chapters instead of TRIPS as a safeguard against expropriation claims.527 For 
instance, Article 1110(7) of NAFTA exempts “the issuance of compulsory 
licensing” and “the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property 
rights” from expropriation protection, if such measures are consistent with 
NAFTA Chapter 17.528 NAFTA Chapter 17 contains “TRIPS-plus” provisions 
on IP rights, which strengthen the IP regimes of NAFTA countries beyond the 
global standards established by the TRIPS Agreement. For instance, NAFTA 
Chapter 17 does not include provisions analogous to Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Still, arbitrators can take into account public interest 
considerations under a number of flexibilities embodied in NAFTA Chapter 
17.529 For instance, states can exclude certain inventions from patentability,530 
introduce limited exceptions,531 and compulsory licenses,532 as well as revoke 
the patents.533  
Striking an appropriate balance between the private and public interests in 
investment arbitration should be easier where states have appended declarations 
to their FTAs clarifying the interplay between the expropriation provision 
                                                                                                                               
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”). 
525 Id. (“In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.”). 
526 For instance, the EU has referred to the provisions of the Doha Declaration as an 
overarching principle in its bilateral trade agreements with Korea, Colombia and Peru, and 
Central America. See Access to Medicines, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-property/access-to-medicines/ (last visited Oct. 
16, 2015). 
527 Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 393, at 36–7. 
528 NAFTA, supra note 16, at  art. 1110(7). 
529 Id. at art. 1709. 
530 Id. at art. 1706(2). 
531 Id. at art. 1706(6). 
532 Id. at art. 1706(10). 
533 Id. at art. 1706(8). 
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(included in the investment chapter) and IP provisions (included in the relevant 
chapter). For instance, in the Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA),534 a declaration appended to the expropriation provision of 
Chapter X, which governs foreign direct investment,535 clarifies that “investor 
state dispute settlement tribunals … are not an appeal mechanism for the 
decisions of domestic courts,” and that “the domestic courts of each Party are 
responsible for the determination of the existence and validity of intellectual 
property rights.”536 This means that arbitration tribunals should be deferential to 
the decisions of domestic courts and tribunals regarding the existence and 
validity of patents. The mere fact that a company is disappointed with the 
outcome of a patent trial does not amount to a breach of the relevant treaty 
provisions. CETA reasserts “each Party shall be free to determine the 
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement regarding 
intellectual property within their own legal system and practice.” 537  The 
possibility to issue binding interpretations at a later stage is also reserved.538 
Moreover, Article 3 of Chapter 22, which governs intellectual property, refers to 
the Doha Declaration, thus incorporating its interpretative guidelines on 
balancing IP rights and public health.539 
In most cases, however, IIAs make no reference to the TRIPS Agreement. 
In the absence of an express reference, it would be a radical departure from the 
text of the IIA, as well as the DSU,540 to provide investors with the possibility of 
asserting violations of the TRIPS Agreement against host states. Therefore, in 
the absence of a reference to the TRIPS Agreement, the argument that an 
investor can assert a claim for a violation of the state’s TRIPS obligation in an 
investor-state arbitration proves too much.  
                                         
534 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Sep. 26, 2014, European 
Comm’n, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/. 
535 Id. at art. X.11, ¶ 6. 
536 Id. 
537 Id. 
538 Id.  
539 Id. at ch. 22, art. 3 (recognizing “the importance of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health” and providing that “[i]n interpreting and implementing the 
rights and obligations under this Chapter, the Parties shall ensure consistency with this 
Declaration” and that “[t]he Parties shall contribute to the implementation and respect the 
Decision of the WTO General Council of 30 August 2003 on Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, as well as the Protocol amending 
the TRIPS Agreement, done at Geneva on 6 December 2005.”). 
540 DSU art. 3. 
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However, this does not mean that the TRIPS Agreement is irrelevant. The 
TRIPS Agreement can provide interpretive guidance and context.541 If the 
applicable law is national law, as is the case for IP, which is territorial by 
nature, and national law implements the TRIPS Agreement, the interpretation of 
the relevant TRIPS provisions may help the arbitral tribunal to ascertain the 
legitimacy of the same state measures, their rationality and reasonableness, and 
their eventual conformity with international practice. In turn, this could foster a 
coherent international framework of IP rules.  
Treaty interpretation can also provide the adjudicators with interpretive 
tools to reconcile the public and private interests emerging in the new dialectics 
between patent protection and public health in international investment law and 
arbitration. When adjudicating investment disputes, arbitrators must identify the 
applicable rules, clarify their meaning and relate them to the specific facts of the 
case. When the arbitrators have limited expertise on IP and its policy 
implications, experts should be consulted to facilitate sound decision-making 
and ensure the arbitrators take into account the two equilibria that characterize 
patent regulation.  
The intrinsic equilibrium between private and public interest concerns the 
very structure or architecture of patents. It is evident in the conceptual matrix of 
patent regime. The “patent bargain” indicates the quid pro quo between the 
private and public interests that are intrinsic to the patent regime. For instance, 
compulsory licenses, limited exceptions and even the grant and revocation of 
patents provide means to limit the private interests under certain circumstances 
and give a margin of deference to policymakers and adjudicators to determine 
whether a patent should be granted, or revoked, or limited. 
In parallel, the extrinsic equilibrium between patent rights and other 
values appears in the interplay between the IP regime and other fields of law. If 
one adopts an instrumentalist view of IP, the international IP system should 
function for the good of all. The notion that the IP regime serves such a social 
function is widely accepted in international law,542 as expressly indicated by 
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.543 In scrutinizing the regime complex 
that governs IP, it appears that IP is never an absolute right.544 Rather, IP rights 
                                         
541 Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment 
Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 493, 503–6 (2003). 
542 See generally Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, 
or How Ethics can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law (Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Working Paper No. 13-06, 2013). 
543 TRIPS Agreement arts. 7, 8. 
544 Geiger, supra note 542, at 5 (stressing that “there cannot be an ‘absolute’ right that can 
be exercised in a totally selfish manner with no consideration for the consequences that this 
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must be put into perspective as they are part of a broader legal system,545 and 
must always be harmonized with other rights of equally significant value and 
with the interests of the community.546 This is particularly the case with regard 
to pharmaceuticals, which have deep implications in public health.  
Finally, arbitrators should acknowledge their responsibility for the 
charting of the contours of international law norms and, more broadly, as 
cartographers of the international legal order. Pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT, adjudicators should take into account “[a]ny relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”547 Therefore, 
“[e]very treaty provision must be read not only in its own context, but in the 
wider context of general international law, whether conventional or 
customary.”548 A number of international organizations play an active role in the 
governance of pharmaceutical patents, creating a sort of institutional density or 
regime complex. As all these organizations receive almost worldwide 
consensus, a broader perspective of the legal environment that surrounds a 
given dispute should be adopted in investor-state arbitration.  
CONCLUSION 
This article highlights the emergence of international investment law and 
arbitration as a new battlefield, where the dialectical interaction between private 
and public interest is taking place. The clash between the economic interests of 
the patent owner and the pursuit of public policies is not a new phenomenon; 
what is new is the use of investment treaty law and arbitration as a place of 
confrontation between these private and public interests. International 
investment law is a vital area of international law that has furthered the 
protection of patents, considering them as a form of investment and providing 
patent owners access to investor-state arbitration. By including intellectual 
property within their ambit, investment treaties restrict the regulatory autonomy 
of states in the pharmaceutical sector, potentially affecting fundamental public 
                                                                                                                               
exercise involves, but only rights that are ‘relativized’ by the rights of others and the well-
being of the community.”). 
545 Id. at 4. 
546 Id. See also Jakob Cornides, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or 
Convergence?, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 135, 143 (2004) (pointing out that “property is not 
an end in itself. Obviously, it must be used in a way that contributes to the realization of the 
higher objectives of human society.”); Daniel J. Gervais, The Changing Landscape of 
International Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 49, 60 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) 
(cautioning that “one should not protect beyond what is necessary to achieve policy 
objective(s) because the risk of a substantial negative general welfare impact is too high.”). 
547 Vienna Convention art. 31(3)(c). 
548 IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 139 (1984). 
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interests. Patent owners have increasingly used investment treaty arbitration to 
challenge alleged infringements of patent rights by governments, giving rise to 
an increasingly complex and contested interplay between pharmaceutical patent 
protection and public health. 
This article examines the growing number of investment treaty 
arbitrations relating to pharmaceutical patents and critically assesses how the 
emerging dialectics between public and private interests is taking place in 
investment treaty arbitration. These arbitrations give rise to both jurisdictional 
and substantive issues. First, some disputes will center on the question as to 
which economic activities amount to an investment, giving rise to the arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute.549 Second, although it may be very 
difficult to prove, an affected patent owner may claim that an unlawful 
expropriation has taken place.550 Third, if an expropriation has occurred, claims 
may concern the adequacy of the amount, or mode, of compensation.551 Fourth, 
the patent owner may also allege a violation of the FET standard.552 Finally, 
some claims may concern alleged discrimination suffered by the foreign 
investor.553  
This article argues that international investment law and arbitration 
should contribute to the construction of public international law as a unitary 
whole, which aims at furthering public policy interests internationally. To the 
extent that investment treaty arbitration has failed to do so, either by de-
emphasizing public policies or leaving them out entirely, it would be 
problematic to move forward with globally important policy issues through the 
vehicle of public international law.  
Against the critical examination of the legal norms that are developing in 
the field, this article proposes some legislative and interpretive approaches to 
better accommodate the dialectics between private and public interests in 
pharmaceutical patent-related investment disputes. Treaty-making and 
interpretation can play a crucial role to address the tension between, and 
eventually reconcile, public and private interests. 
At the normative level, treaty negotiators can introduce some 
clarifications, flexibilities or carve-outs in the text of investment treaties. Treaty 
drafting can improve the language of international investment agreements to 
include reference to other international instruments, such as the Doha 
                                         
549 See supra Section IV. A. 
550 See supra Section IV. B.  
551 See supra Section IV. C. 
552 See supra Section IV. D.  
553 See supra Section IV. E.  
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Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Although these other 
instruments are not necessarily promoting a better balance between the public 
and private interests, reference to such international law instruments can still 
help international arbitrators to obtain useful information on how other 
instruments are coping with the interaction between private and public interests, 
as well as achieve mutual support and harmonization across instruments. 
Negotiators could consider carving out litigation on pharmaceutical patents 
from the jurisdiction of investment arbitral tribunals.  
Interpretation can help arbitrators reach a suitable balance between the 
protection of patent rights qua foreign investments and other non-economic 
values in public health-related investment disputes. Arbitrators should focus on 
the nature and purpose of the right that is being protected. Intellectual property 
rights should not be considered as absolute rights but should be interpreted in 
the light of their goals and limits. Regulations adopted to protect public health, 
depending on the specific circumstances of the case, might be viewed as an 
intrinsic limit to the patent right. Foreign investments protection, when applied 
to pharmaceutical patents, should be considered not as an end in itself but as 
one of the available tools to promote human welfare. Moreover, as required by 
customary rules of treaty interpretation, arbitrators should embrace their roles as 
cartographers of international law and adopt a holistic approach to treaty 
interpretation, which takes into account other international law instruments that 
are binding upon the parties.  
